Legal Consciousness and Dispute Resolution: Different Disputing Behavior at Two Similar Taxicab Companies

This article examines how workers perceive the laws and rules that regulate their workplaces and how these perceptions differ depending on whether one works in an organization with a high level of worker-manager cooperation versus one with a more conventional hierarchy. Using two cab companies as examples, this article explores how these divergent organizational structures generate different grievance cultures that in turn encourage alternate understanding of availavle choices and appropriate means for resolving such disputes.
This work expands the current sociolegal literature on legal consciousness by focusing on formal and informal workplace grievance resolution and perceptions of workplace conflict. In exploring the critical decision making regarding grievance resolution, this article begins an important discussion about workplace empowerment and legal consciousness. This study uses qualitative methods to examine 33 open-ended interviews. The use of qualitative methods permits a vibrant dialog that illustrates the legal consciousness of the subjects, The subjects'own words reveal their comprehension of rules, regulations, and procedures as well as their individual relationships with the grievance-resolution options in their workplaces.     

Growth curves of deviant behavior in early adolescence: A multilevel analysis

Multilevel growth curve models provide a means of analyzing individual differences in the growth of deviance, allow a number of theories to be integrated in a single model, and can help to unify research on deviant/delinquent/criminal careers at different stages of the life cycle. Building on the distinction between population heterogeneity and state dependence as alternative explanations of persistent individual differences in deviance (Heckman, 1981; Nagin and Paternoster, 1991), we show that models with two levels can be used to represent and analyze a variety of criminological theories. The first level (level 1) uses repeated measurements on individuals to estimate individual-level growth curves. The second level treats the level 1 growth curve parameters (e.g., slope, intercept) as outcome variables and uses time-invariant factors to explain variation in these parameters across individuals. We illustrate this approach by estimating a model of growth in deviance drawn from Gottfredson and Hirschi's deviant propensity theory. An innovative feature is the assumption that adolescents' expected growth curves of deviance follow a classical Pearl-Verhulst logistic growth model (Pearl, 1930). The results suggest that five risk factors—parental psychiatric problems, lack of parental support, living arrangements with zero or one parent in residence, low family income, and male gender—have strongly positive effects on deviant propensity. For example, adolescents with no supportive parents, and no other risk factors, have expected asymptotic levels of deviance (peak levels attained at about age 18) that are about twice as high as those of adolescents with no risk factors. Yet more than two-thirds of the individual-level variability in growth curves is unexplained by the five risk factors. This unobserved heterogeneity would remain hidden in analyses using conventional structural equations models and the same explanatory variables.     

A tax by any other name: The donor directed automatic percentage contribution bonus,a budget alternative for financing governmental support of charity

Our paper analyzes the merits of four alternatives for providing governmental support to charity—the existing tax write-off, a tax credit, a sliding matching grant, and a percentage contribution bonus. After searching for an appropriate budget mechanism (a five-year fixed-sum authorization and appropriation), we apply a wide-ranging set of criteria—equity, legitimacy, efficiency, reciprocity, controllability, etc.—to each of the four alternatives. In brief, the existing tax write-off is grossly inequitable among donors, poorly controlled by government, and is part of a tax system increasingly viewed as illegitimate by citizens. The advantages of the write-off are that it produces predictable amounts of income at low administrative cost without overtly raising questions of constitutionality. Its disadvantages would be mitigated by a tax credit in proportion to the amounts contributed by taxpayers. But the credit does not reach people who do not file returns and may significantly decrease income to charitable agencies. The sliding matching grant (under which the government pays to charity in proportion as the individual gives of his income) provides a particular form of equity for taxpayers but is deficient in other respects. The contribution bonus—a percentage of each dollar contributed paid to charity by government—is wholly equitable, includes all givers, sustains reciprocity with recipients, is controllable by government, and is legitimate in treating expenditures as expenditures and not as tax dodges. It also raises the possibility of increasing the government's contribution. The defects of the bonus are higher administrative costs and potential doubt about constitutionality. We conclude in favor of a percentage contribution bonus set high enough to provide marginally more income for charity and reduce financial uncertainties during the transition. Appraisal of political feasibility suggests that supporters of charity are likely to be worse off unless they come up with a more defensible approach, such as the contribution bonus. To help resolve doubts, we suggest adding on a small percentage contribution bonus to the present tax write-off for three years so as to test constitutionality and assess more precisely administrative costs. While there is no one proposal that will make everyone better off, the contribution bonus is far superior on most criteria to the alternatives.The paper was written for The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs. For their criticisms and constructive comments, including those with which we disagreed, we express our appreciation to Professors John McNulty and Lawrence Stone, Law School, and Professors Arnold Meltsner and William Niskanen, Graduate School of Public Policy, all of the University of California (Berkeley).