South Tyrol's changing political system: from dissociative on the road to associative conflict resolution

South Tyrol (Italy), with its three officially recognized language groups (Germans, Italians and Ladins), is a successful model of how a minority problem can be solved. It is based upon the principle of dissociative conflict resolution, which means separating the language groups as much as possible between themselves, as well as the principle of consociational democracy, which focuses primarily on the cooperation between the language groups' elites. In the last few years it has been observed that while the institutional frame has not changed, society has, thereby starting to undermine the existing political and institutional system from below. This concerns mainly the ethnic division, which is being questioned more and more by civil society, as well as aspects of cooperation between the elites. As a consequence of this process, South Tyrol's autonomy is moving toward further integration, with the latter again translating into strengthening the two factors of territoriality and identity.     

The Long Shadow of Band Aid Humanitarianism: revisiting the dynamics between famine and celebrity

This paper traces the emergence of Band Aid celebrity humanitarianism and its ongoing legacy, making use of Tester’s concept of ‘common-sense humanitarianism’ and Fassin’s reasoning on ‘humanitarian governance’. Using different examples of celebrity engagement during the 1983–85 famine in Ethiopia and the 2011 famine in Somalia, it argues that the, in essence, anti-political understanding of disaster propagated by celebrity humanitarians not only masks the underlying dynamics of power and of social and economic relations that underpin every famine, but at the same time manufactures a truth about ‘Africa’ and other places perceived as destitute. In doing so celebrity humanitarianism more generally legitimises a global hegemonic system characterised by increasing inequalities.     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”     

Support for Strongman Rule in Ethnically Divided Societies: Evidence from Estonia and Latvia

Using data from Estonia and Latvia from 2004, this study maps and analyzes support for authoritarianism in ethnically divided societies. It develops and tests three explanatory models, focusing on socialization and the political and economic aspects of regime performance. Because the correlates of authoritarian support may vary by ethnic group, separate models are run for the ethnic majority and the minority. The results lend some support to all three theoretical approaches, although none of these can be considered to be a powerful explanation of support for authoritarianism. The determinants of support for strongman rule vary with ethnicity, suggesting that future studies on political support in multiethnic societies should systematically control for the effects of ethnicity.     

The Swiss Upper House: ‘Chambre de Réflexion’ or Conservative Renegades?

Theoretical analyses suggest that bicameral systems have policy consequences if the preferences of the two chambers differ. This paper offers an analysis of the ideological positions of the MPs in the two chambers of the Swiss parliament. Contrary to conventional wisdom the analyses relying on MP surveys and roll call analyses suggest that the MPs of the same party hardly differ with respect to their ideological positions. While the MP survey suggests that the Swiss upper house is more conservative given the underrepresentation of leftist parties in the latter chamber, similar differences fail to appear in the roll call analyses in a systematic way. Hence, the Swiss upper house is hardly a conservative bastion.     

Labour protest and industrial peace: Russian steelworkers’ encounters with economic reforms and unravelling social protections

Abstract

This paper is about knowledge limits and the financial crisis. It begins by examining various existing accounts of crisis which disagree about the causes, but share the belief that the crisis represents a problem of socio-technical malfunction which requires some kind of technocratic fix: the three variants on this explanation are the crisis as accident, conspiracy or calculative failure. This paper proposes an alternative explanation which frames the crisis differently as an elite political debacle. Political and technocratic elites were hubristically detached from the process of financial innovation as it took the form of ‘bricolage’, which put finance beyond technical control or management. The paper raises fundamental questions about the politicized role of technocrats after the 1980s and emphasizes the need to bring private finance and its public regulators under democratic political control whose technical precondition is a dramatic simplification of finance.     

The Swiss business elite (1980–2000): how the changing composition of the elite explains the decline of the Swiss company network

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the decline of the Swiss corporate network between 1980 and 2000. We address the theoretical and methodological challenge of this transformation by the use of a combination of network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). Based on a sample of top managers of the 110 largest Swiss companies in 1980 and 2000 we show that, beyond an adjustment to structural pressure, an explanation of the decline of the network has to include the strategies of the fractions of the business elites. We reveal that three factors contribute crucially to the decline of the Swiss corporate network: the managerialization of industrial leaders, the marginalization of law degree holders and the influx of hardly connected foreign managers.     

Shareholder value in an adverse environment: the German case

The German political economy has often been cited as a classical case of non-shareholder value orientation. Its productionist, long-term, consensus orientation has often been contrasted with the 'Anglo-Saxon approach'. The influence of shareholders who press for shareholder value and the importance of the equity market have traditionally been low. But there are signs of change. In this article we describe some of these changes and try to assess the dynamics of this change process. First we show that the limited role of the equity market for company financing and for private household savings still provides a very narrow base for a shareholder value economy in Germany. The central pillars of the German system of corporate governance - the dominating role of banks, the system of co-determination and the company centred management system - are not crumbling. Change in the direction of shareholder value is therefore limited.     

Linguistic Radicalisation of Right-Wing and Salafi Jihadist Groups in Social Media: a Corpus-Driven Lexicometric Analysis

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research - Social media groups, for example on Facebook, WhatsApp or Telegram, allow for direct exchange, communication and interaction, as well as...     

Procedure over substance? CETA and the political economy of subsidiarity

ABSTRACT

Competing notions of subsidiarity can help to understand the intricacies of new types of trade deals as concluded between Canada and the European Union. From this perspective the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) balances two fundamentally different models of economic distribution and decision making authority either giving priority to private actors and their domestic communities or to political institutions aiming for a social embedding within global markets. Examining CETA as an unusual compromise in international regulatory cooperation, this article focuses on the settlement of highly contentious issues through complex procedural innovation. While this eventually made a final agreement between trading partners with two different polities possible, it could not settle widely diverging assessments about the long-term economic effects of the new deal. As a consequence, and to build bridges between distinct spaces of subsidiarity, the final agreement represents a flexible and open-ended approach to future trade relations.