The hate that dare not speak its name: Pornography qua semi-political speech

In this essay we shall examine the contemporary jurisprudential thinking and legal precedents surrounding the issue of the sanctionability of pornography. We shall catalogue them by their logical presumptions, such as whether they view pornography as speech or act, whether they view pornography as obscenity, political hate-speech or anomalous other, whether they would scrutinize legislation governing pornography by a balancing of the harm of repression against the harm of permission, and who exactly they view as the victims.We shall take a special interest in the most recent, but unsuccessful, attempt by a subgroup of feminists to proscribe pornography by treating it as neither political speech nor sexual speech but speech which causes harm which is both political and sexual. They would like it to be considered as a special kind of odious propaganda undeserving of protection because it promulgates a mental state conducive to criminal activity, and hence is criminal in and of itself. However, the repression of propaganda, even odious propaganda, is not so easily accomplished in this country.Most anti-censors have emphasized the uncertainty of the causal connection between pornography and sexual violence. We shall contend that this is not the essential issue, and that, even if we agree with the allegations of pornography's prurient non-intellectual appeal and its tendency to excite criminal hostility, the current understanding of the Bill of Rights allows sanctioning only under the stringent requirement of the showing of a clear and present danger of specific and immediate acts.We raise the question of whether there should be a new standard for speech which is simultaneously political and sexual, and/or for speech whose harmful message is presented subliminally, on the grounds that such speech may not be adequately opposed by counter speech in the marketplace of ideas.     

Being Canadian: Citizenship in Canada

This article analyses interviews conducted in 1996–97 with 78civic leaders in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. In part, the interviews focused on what it means to respondents to be Canadian. Among the respondents were 36 immigrants and 23 persons not of European ancestry, including four aboriginal people. The article addresses the challenge of creating a sense of citizenship—a moral sense of belonging—among a population of increasingly diverse origin in anglophone Canada. The argument proposed is that despite the diverse ancestral and geographical origins of the inhabitants of the country, Canadianness exists. Canadians, both native‐born and immigrants, recognize themselves as Canadians. They do so because they recognize the opportunities and freedoms available to them in Canada, and the day‐to‐day respect they enjoy. To be Canadian and recognized as such by others is meaningful. Even very recent immigrants do not define themselves primarily as members of their ancestral cultural communities. Spinner's concept of pluralistic integration seems a better way to describe Canadian society than the popular concept of multiculturalism.     

Hegemony and Autonomy

This article analyzes the concept of hegemony and examines its relationship to power and autonomy. Refuting the conventional belief that it is ideology that distinguishes hegemony, the article argues that it is autonomy that constitutes the distinguishing characteristic. Although hegemons tend to evolve into imperialists, hegemony involves leadership of an alliance, not domination by coercion. It is impossible to conceptualize hegemony without also including autonomy. In this conceptualization, the primary source of autonomy lies in a specific hegemonic system of domination that itself embodies the notion of autonomy for both the polity and its citizenry, a limiting construction that hinders the tendency toward imperialism. Such a system includes one type of autonomy that can be designated as autonomy within hegemony. In addition, the article discusses two other types of autonomy: counterhegemony and a largely power-based opposed hegemony. Thus, the article concludes, hegemony is a complex concept, with several types of manifestation, that can more usefully be understood in connection with autonomy and power than as a stand-alone concept.