POLITICS, POLICY MAKING AND PRESSURE GROUPS: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Abstract: In Australia, current policy making is characterized by immobilism, drift and "pluralistic stagnation". The problem is not lack of technical expertise, but the mobilization of political consent in a polity in which pressure groups have proliferated. In the post-war period, the welfare state/managed economy has transformed the role of government and the potential power of pressure groups. New networks of interdependency have developed. Some of the principal groups are beneficiaries of redistributive programs, producer groups, state and local government agencies and professionals in government. Their potential power has been made actual by a new participative ethic. The post-materialist values of which this is part also result in the growth of groups focusing on quality of life and moral issues. In this context the political parties are losing their central place in the polity and the centralized organs of executive government appear over-secretive and aloof. Reforms are needed to realign institutions with the new cultural and structural realities. Broader interest group involvement is needed. Parliament, through a committee system, could play a major role and its historical function as custodian of the public interest should be revived. Departments must find new ways to involve more groups in policy formulation and implementation. Information must be shared more widely and policy analysts and advisors should work more closely with groups in defining issues, negotiating alternatives and encouraging the development of supportive coalitions. New "intelligence" and "outreach" functions within the public service are required, and the existing approaches of policy units and research bureaux should be remodelled.     

The State and the Economy: Opinion Formation and Collaboration as Facets of Economic Management

This paper seeks to extend discussion of the areas of state activity that are relevant to economic performance. It does this by linking several literatures that are now usually considered in isolation from each other. These are institutionalist theory, developmental state theory, and comparative and historical institutionalism. The paper focuses particularly on the experience of the east Asian developmental states. The paper suggests a new role for the state as catalyst in the formation of ideas, choice sets and motives concerning economic performance. It can play this role at national and policy community levels and in relation to desired overall outcomes, export or cluster development and innovation. The notion that economic globalization will inexorably drive convergence between states is discounted. On the contrary, this is as likely to nourish miscomprehension or incomprehension between citizens of different states. This is an additional reason for attending to the quality of opinion formation by states.     

Program Strategy and Coalition Building as Facets of New Public Management

This paper explores two issues: first, the strategic and coalition-building tasks that may be routinely associated with New Public Management (NPM); and second, the implications of acknowledging these tasks for the conception of public management. NPM focuses on performance. It invites managers to accept responsibility for whole programs or systems (Kettle, 1997; Dunleavy, 1994; Ridley, 1996; Hood, 1995). This directs attention to basic program frameworks (that is, program strategy), as well as to operations. It involves the purposes of programs. It involves routine attention to such factors as the effectiveness of outcomes, the identification of alternative program configurations, the implications of emerging issues and needs, and the mobilisation of authority for change. In practice, this authority derives both from program stakeholders, as well as from ministers and the broader political system.     

THE ASSETS TEST: A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF EXPENDITURE CONTROL*

Abstract: The assets test episode provides a case study in the difficulties modern governments face when confronted by numerous and powerful interest groups. The assets test decision was made somewhat hastily and without extensive consultation, resulting in a major outcry from interest groups. The government reacted by setting in train a process of “consultation” and subsequently announced a series of concessions. Opposition continued and further modifications were made to the scheme, reducing considerably its impact and the proposed savings. Several lessons can be drawn. Governments must attempt to consult affected interests seriously in the process of formulating proposals and, if necessary, mobilise countervailing interests against a dominant coalition. Joint discussions can help to moderate sharp differences. The private, bureaucratic worlds of policy making, particularly in the budget cycle, must be opened up. Fundamental changes to the “culture” of policy making may be necessary, in particular greater efforts to encourage bipartisanship and to use Parliament constructively, if expenditure control and program reconstruction are to be achieved.     

Economic voting in a crisis: The Irish election of 2011

The paper explores a question raised by the 2011 Irish election, which saw an almost unprecedented decline in support for a major governing party after an economic collapse that necessitated an ECB/IMF ‘bailout’. This seems a classic case of ‘economic voting’ in which a government is punished for incompetent performance. How did the government lose this support: gradually, as successive economic indicators appeared negative, or dramatically, following major shocks? The evidence points to losses at two critical junctures. This is consistent with an interpretation of the link between economics and politics that allows for qualitative judgements by voters in assigning credit and blame for economic performance.