Adapting Adoption: A Case of Closet Politics?

The Adoption and Children Act 2002 addressed problems of delayin the adoption process, particularly with regard to childrenlooked after in the care system. This article reviews the backgroundto the Act and considers critically its emphasis on administrativereform. While the problem of delay was addressed mainly in administrativeterms, the issue could not be entirely separated from politicaldebate. In the lead-up to the Act political controversy centredon racial matching; during its passage, it focused on the legalizationof same-sex adoption. The Government effectively diffused oppositionon both counts through its emphasis on pragmatic reform to promotethe welfare of the child. The article characterizes this approachas ‘closet politics’ and suggests that such pragmatismmay exact a price in terms of implementation. The failure toaddress or resolve underlying issues of principle may mean thatlegislative change has only a limited effect on professionalpractice and public prejudice.     

The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?

The European Parliament has generally been deeply distrustful of the comitology system, primarily on the grounds that it allows the national administrations to undermine its supervisory role in the area of implementing legislation. Parliament has therefore sought to use the political, budgetary and jurisdictional means at its disposal to counteract the spread of comitology, or at least to promote the less intrusive forms of committee procedure. These initiatives have not, for the most part, been wholly successful; neither the interinstitutional agreements nor Parliament's arguments before the Court of Justice have produced the results it had hoped for. Parliament has been able, however, to use its Maastricht powers to influence the choice of committee procedure included in legislation adopted under codecision, and its budgetary tactics have forced the Commission to rationalise somewhat the annual expenditure on committees of all kinds and to bring a modicum of transparency into their operation. The imminence of the intergovernmental conference led to a suspension of hostilities towards the end of 1996.     

How stable is party identification?

This essay refines and extends our argument (Green and Palmquist, 1990) that net of the distorting effects of measurement error, Americans' partisanship tends to be highly stable over time. Three challenges to this thesis are addressed. In response to doubts about the generalizability of our earlier findings to panel studies of longer duration or from other eras, we show that nine multi-wave panel studies yield similar results. Next, we take up the question of whether our model can account for observed patterns of partisan conversion. The rate of party-switching forces some modifications in the statistical assumptions used to model party identification over time, but a revised model which can account for inter-party change reproduces earlier findings of partisan stability. Third, we grapple with the question of how our findings square with fluctuations in what has been termed macropartisanship. We suggest that aggregate shifts in party identification need not be incompatible with strong over-time correlations at the individual level. Finally, we develop a simulation of micropartisanship to illustrate that over long stretches of time very gradual changes in partisanship can accumulate to produce appreciable levels of micropartisan change.Donald Philip Green, Yale University.Bradley Palmquist, Harvard University.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 3–6, 1992.