Offending Frequency and Responses to Illegal Monetary Incentives

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - We examine how responsive offenders are to illegal monetary incentives. We draw from rational choice theory, prospect theory, and models of labor supply to...     

House arrest with electronic monitoring: the Rio de Janeiro experience

This article outlines the House Curfew with Electronic Monitoring (HCEM) experience in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Recently implemented in this Brazilian jurisdiction, HCEM has already achieved positive outcomes in terms of post-trial de-incarceration, as it reduced the open prison population by 35% from 2009 to 2014. In addition to describing and critically discussing these changes in the Rio de Janeiro criminal justice system, the study also reports offenders’ perceptions regarding this new crime control method in Rio de Janeiro. This perspective provides interesting feedback regarding HCEM in terms of safety, its punitive character, technological problems, constraints, and stigmatisation.