The political economy of central bank intervention

This paper analyzes an exchange rate policy game between a central bank and rational speculators under symmetric information. The central bank tries to counteract shocks to the exchange rate by means of sterilized intervention working through the expectations channel. Private speculators resist being fooled. They anticipate the interventions. An “intervention bias” results with an inefficiently high equilibrium volume of intervention which does not reduce the impact of shocks to the exchange rate. The model implies that the more independent the central bank the smaller and the more consistent the intervention efforts. An empirical illustration lends some support to the model.     

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS

Abstract: Traditionally public policy analysis has been able to employ the conceptual framework offered by the theory of market failure in order to evaluate the efficiency of market outcomes. However, until fairly recently, no corresponding analytical structure existed which could facilitate the examination of the efficiency and equity characteristics of government or non-market outcomes. Quite apart from public choice theory, an embryonic normative theory of government failure has now been developed which can act as a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present, three theories of government failure coexist in the literature: Wolf's theory of non-market failure; Le Grand's theory of government failure; and Vining and Weimer's theory of govern- ment production failure. These models form the basis for a more universal theory of government failure. Nevertheless, in its current state of development this seminal literature can still assist in rational public policy design subject to certain caveats. Foremost amongst these is the need for policy analysts to augment the efficiency and equity criteria with some additional broader normative measures, and the necessity for care to be taken in the use of allocative efficiency as a benchmark in non-market circumstances.     

Workplace education for hourly workers

Concerns about U.S. competitiveness have increasingly focused the attention of policymakers on the workforce and mechanisms that could be used to enhance both the quality and quantity of human capital in the workplace. This article focuses on basic skills education of hourly workers, precisely the type of human capital which is likely to be most underprovided by the private market. Five questions are addressed: First, what is the nature of workplace education programs? Second, why do some firms provide workplace education programs while others do not? Third, what, if any, characteristics distinguish those firms that provide workplace education programs from seemingly comparable firms that do not? Fourth, what, if any, evidence can be found identifying the effects of these programs on the firms that sponsor them? Fifth, what policies appear most likely to stimulate additional workplace education?     

Market incentives to encourage household waste recycling: Paying for what you throw away

This article investigates the use of market incentives to encourage household waste recycling by pricing waste-disposal services according to the quantity of waste generated. We use a natural experiment from an upstate New York county to examine how quantity-based pricing of waste disposal affects reported household recycling behavior, when used by itself or in conjunction with curbside pickup of recyclables or mandatory recycling laws. Curbside pickup was found to have the greatest effect on reported recycling behavior, although higher waste-disposal prices might alter these conclusions. Other concerns about quantity-based pricing of solid waste—distributional effects, public acceptance, and adverse incentives—are also examined.     

Freedom and growth: Do constitutions matter?

This paper uses an augmented Solow model, with cross section data, to measure the effect on per-capita income of a) the entrenchment of various rights in a country's constitution and b) the level of economic freedom in a country, broadly construed. The results suggest that entrenchment,per se, of any single right seldom has a significant general economic effect, while the effect of economic freedom is significant and substantial. The paper then considers whether such evidence could support the proposition that “constitutions do not matter.” While it concludes otherwise, it does caution against incurring excessive negotiation costs to obtain entrenchment of a comprehensive “wish list” of rights.     

Explaining differences in productive efficiency: An application to Belgian municipalities

The purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in Belgium. Technical efficiency is evaluated using a non-parametric method based on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) reference technology. We first calculate input, output, and graph Farrell efficiency measures for a cross-section of all 589 Belgian municipalities. In a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment.