'To Secure the Blessings of Liberty': Liberty and American Federal Democracy

The founding and subsequent development of the United Stateshave been characterized by a tension between two kinds of liberty,which can be called natural liberty and federal liberty. Naturalliberty refers to the freedom of individuals to do as they pleasewithout being shackled by civil society. Federal liberty refersto the liberty to be a partner in establishing the covenantfounding civil society, and then the liberty to live accordingto the terms of the covenant. Federal liberty has taken twoforms in America: one concerning the relationship between individualsand civil society, and one concerning the relationship betweenthe states and the federal government under the U.S. Constitution.Out of the tension between natural and federal liberty, thereemerged two constitutional traditions: the U.S. constitutionaltradition, which has emphasized individualism and the marketplace,and the state constitutional tradition, which has emphasizedcommunity and commonwealth. Since the end of World War II, however,there has been a shift away from historic syntheses of marketplaceand commonwealth. Increasingly, the states have been deniedtheir constitutional powers to support any particular moralorder other than that of the marketplace, and the federal governmenthas undertaken to establish a new morality of equality for thenation as a whole.     

ECONOMIC CONVERSION: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES

While arms control and disarmament represent efforts to respond to the military and political factors in the arms race, there has not been a com- parable effort to reduce the economic incentives. To do so military contrac- tors would have to be able to convert their production facilities to civilian manufacturing without loss of profits or workers.     

Rethinking early intervention

With Bernard Spodek, he edited Early Childhood Education: Issues and Highlights.He has written or edited more than 30 other books and contributed more than 300 articles to educational, psychological, and practitioner journals on such topics as giftedness and talent development, educational productivity, international comparisons, instruction, and parent education.     

On democracy and debt

As we explained there is really little a priori reasoning for a clear prediction that authoritarian regimes will incur more foreign debt. In fact, some other empirical literature reveals that such regimes will face a higher supply price for such debt. Anderson presents a study of a single year using an admittedly crude measure of authoritarianism that finds that such regimes do issue more debt.This study provides a fuller examination of the empirical relationship between foreign debt and the nature of the polity's regime. Utilizing a continuous democracy variable and a continuous political liberty variable, it tests the relationship between debt and political variables. It finds little empirical support for the thesis that democracy or autocracy influence foreign debt levels. Generally the continuous variables are not significant if we use a linear in the logs specification. While a linear specification obtains results more consistent with the idea that level of democracy decreases debt, it also obtains results even less favorable to the idea that extreme forms of autocracy increase debt.     

Manging state government operations: Changing visions of staff agencies

Centralized staff agencies embody the early 20th century bureaucratic reform vision of good government. The behavior of these agencies, as well as the conception of administration contained in the bureaucratic reform vision, are often criticized. Feasible alternative conceptions of staff-line-overseer relations are only beginning to emerge through the contextual development of public management ideas and incremental innovation. This article draws on experience in Minnesota state government in order to formulate a “post-bureaucratic” conception of staff-line-overseer relations. In addition, strategies embedding this conception in the practice of the purchasing, staffing, information policy, and internal service functions are briefly explored.     

Explaining Privatization: Notes Towards a Predictive Theory

This article starts from the assumption that some of the theoretical work used to explain welfare-state expansion can be used 'in reverse' to explain privatization, here seen as welfare state contraction, i.e., the transfer from the public to the private sector of the responsibility for certain activities involved in welfare provision. To this end, valiants of the 'power resources' approach are examined. Finding that the 'labour movement' thesis does not have a strong predictive value, I then discuss the 'game theoretical' variant of the 'power resources' approach. Its usefulness for predicting privatization patterns seems limited because of the reductionism built into it. Following the neo-Institutionalists' argument that actor preferences and strategies both reflect and form institutional arrangements of the welfare state, some institutional typologies are developed which are relevant to the course and patterns of privatization. An ideal-type dichotomy between 'pluralist' and 'corporatist' institutions is discussed, in connection with a further delineation of decision-making, financing, and implementing structures. In conclusion, an effort is made to combine actor-oriented and institutional approaches to formulate some preliminary predictions about when and where certain patterns of privatization will occur.