The (Mis)Uses of Detention and the Impact of Bed Space in One Jurisdiction

Analysis of booking data prior to and following the opening of a new facility doubling available bed space reveals that 53.0% of detentions end prior to or at a detention hearing, charges for 48.8% of bookings are for technical violations of probation or status offenses only, and that 62.5% of bookings are for a combination of the prior two offense and other minor offenses. These trends as well as the actual number of youths detained increased with the move into a new facility with twice the bed space. The data suggest that detention is frequently used as shelter and/or punishment even though a juvenile does not technically represent a threat to self, community, or of absconding.     

Out of Place and Out of Line: Positioning the Police in the Regulation of Financial Markets

In November of 2003, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police launched a major initiative to combat securities fraud in Canada. Spurred by the Enron scandals in the United States, this involved the establishment of a series of specialized white-collar crime units with the express mandate of investigating serious cases of securities fraud and protecting investors from the worst of the market's abuses. After four years of activity, these units have produced little in the way of tangible results and have been widely criticized in legal, financial, and regulatory communities. Drawing on thirty-five interviews with members of these units, as well as outside stakeholders including Crown Attorneys and private litigators, this article examines the activities of these Integrated Market Enforcement Teams and highlights a number of barriers to the successful execution of their designated mandate. While factors such as procedural restrictions and limited expertise are certainly relevant, this analysis reveals that the IMET teams are more fundamentally constrained by their position in a broader regulatory field. Understanding this field, and its unique structure and politics, is essential in coming to terms with both the possibilities and limitations of securities enforcement in an increasingly complex financial world.     

MANAGING CITIZEN CALLS TO THE POLICE: THE IMPACT OF BALTIMORE'S 3‐1‐1 CALL SYSTEM*

Research Summary: Our paper explores the impact of implementing a nonemergency 3‐1‐1 call system in Baltimore, Maryland. We found a large (34.2%) reduction in 9‐1‐1 calls following the introduction of the 3‐1‐1 nonemergency call system. Many, but not all, of these calls simply migrated over to the 3‐1‐1 call system. Overall, we identified a 7.7% reduction in recorded citizen calls to the police post 3‐1‐1 intervention. This recorded reduction in citizen calls was confounded by an increase in high priority calls to the 9‐1‐1 system (27.5%), a large overall reduction in low priority calls (54.3%), and an estimated increase (perhaps 8%) in unrecorded calls to the police. We also note a small increase in response times to high priority 9‐1‐1 calls following the implementation of the 3‐1‐1 call system and virtually no change in the amount of officer time available for community policing or problem‐oriented policing activities. Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that nonemergency call systems, such as 3‐1‐1, can greatly facilitate police efforts to better handle citizen calls for police service. However, the intrinsic value of nonemergency call systems is tightly woven with a police department's willingness to change dispatch policies (especially for those calls received via the 3‐1‐1 system), reallocate patrol resources, and adopt organizational reforms to support alternative methods (apart from dispatch) for handling nonemergency calls for service.     

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME: A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE*

Although numerous theories suggest that voluntary organizations contribute to lower crime rates in neighborhoods, the evidence for this proposition is weak. Consequently, we propose a dynamic perspective for understanding the relationship between voluntary organizations and neighborhood crime that involves longitudinal analyses and the measurement of the age of organizations. By using longitudinal data on a sample of census blocks (N = 87,641) located across 10 cities, we test the relationship between age‐graded measures of different types of voluntary organizations and neighborhood crime rates. We use fixed‐effects negative binomial regression models that focus on change within neighborhoods of the relationship between voluntary organizations and neighborhood crime. Our results show that although each type of voluntary organization is found to exhibit crime‐reducing behavior in neighborhoods, we find that many of them are consistent with what we refer to as the “delayed impact scenario”—there is a pronounced delay between the placement of a voluntary organization and a neighborhood subsequently experiencing a reduction in crime. With protective effects of organizations typically not demonstrated until several years after being in the neighborhood, these patterns suggest a need for long‐term investment strategies when examining organizations.