FAMILY ORIGINS OF VIOLENT DELINQUENTS*

Family is central to contemporary theories of delinquent and violent behavior. Yet, the processes by which families shape violent behavior in their children are not well understood. In the past, structural views posited that a weak family exposed a child to the evils of the street. More recently, functionalists have suggested that the family plays an active role in socializing youths to violent behaviors through supervision and discipline practices and modeling and reinforcement of antisocial behaviors. Integrated theories presume that socially disorganized families weaken children's conventional bonds and attachments, leading to associations with delinquent peers and in turn antisocial behavior. However, the influence of the family as a socializing environment may shift over time, and some suggest that its influence is overshadowed during adolescence by that of other social domains—schools, neighborhoods, peers, and work. This study describes the family processes and environments of (n = 98) chronically violent delinquents. Interviews with youths and their mothers assessed family social process and environments and the social domains and institutions with which they interact. Analyses of youth reports of family environments and processes yield three family types: “interactionist” families exhibiting a high degree of internal interaction and bonding; “hierarchical” families characterized by parental dominance and the presence of family bond and interaction patterns; and “antisocial” families marked by criminality and family violence. Family variables have weaker explanatory power than do other social influences on violent delinquency. The relative contributions of family supervision practices and school environment varied by crime type. Social influences outside the family appear as stronger contributors to delinquency and violence during adolescence, regardless of early childhood experiences. The results underscore the importance of integrating social policies regarding family, crime, and neighborhood.     

Nonpartisan Legislative Budget Offices: A Tentative Step toward Improving Legislative Oversight

Strengthening the budgetary powers of legislatures through nonpartisan budget offices adds to the capacity‐building repertoire of development donors. Budget offices are supposed to provide legislatures with information and analysis independent from the executive. The United States Agency for International Development believes that strengthening the legislature's power of the purse improves governance. We highlight USAID‐funded legislative strengthening projects implemented in Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Afghanistan to show how these budget offices function. There is a significant potential for these units to assist members of parliament in understanding the budget process, the broad fiscal challenges facing government, and expenditure control and budgetary trade‐offs that affect present and future spending. These cases demonstrate the challenges of creating and sustaining a parliamentary budget office. Finally, in an effort to make budget offices effective and sustainable, we outline several key steps that we believe are important both for donors and the legislative bodies.