MAKING THE CORE CONTINGENT: PROFESSIONAL AGENCY WORK AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN UK SOCIAL SERVICES

In recent times, the UK has witnessed a steady growth in the use of agency workers to fill core professional roles in public sector organizations. Similar trends have been noted elsewhere, particularly in Australia and the US. In this paper our objective is to explore some of the consequences of this growth, drawing on case study research on social services. We point to a number of problems associated with the management of agency workers and to the potentially negative consequences for the quality of services. These problems, in turn, may impact on key aspects of a (largely functional) public service employment model founded on strong internal labour markets, employment stability and collegial ethos. We also note that while there are ways in which public organizations can manage this situation, certain constraints may prevent them from doing so.     

The J Curve

Globalization may yet repeal the Biblical adage that the poor will always be with us. But for now there are enough losers to go along with the winners that a slide back toward fragmentation and protectionism is a distinct possibility, as was also the case at the turn of the 20th century. Our contributors in this section offer their advice on how to make globalization work for everyone.     

CHILD MALTREATMENT AND YOUTHFUL PROBLEM BEHAVIOR*

This paper adds to an accumulating body of research on the risk of delinquency among maltreated children. We use a prospective research design to address the following questions: (1) To what extent are maltreated children at risk of delinquency? (2) Is their rate of delinquency greater than that of two court-aged, nonmaltreated comparison samples: impoverished children and school children in general? (3) What is the effect of maltreatment net of age, race, gender, and family structure? (4) Is type of maltreatment associated with specific types of juvenile offenses? Maltreated children have higher rates of delinquency complaints than nonmaltreated school and impoverished children, but the effects diminish considerably when the demographic and family structure variables are controlled. In the maltreatment-school comparison, an overall maltreatment effect remains for complaints in general and status offenses, but not for property or violent offenses. Maltreated children are significantly different from nonmaltreated poor children for status offenses only. Specific forms of maltreatment are not especially predictive of any offense type. Generally, we conclude that the maltreatment-delinquency relationship has been exaggerated in previous research.     

THE DYNAMICS OF DELINQUENT PEERS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR*

This analysis examines the dynamic reciprocal relationship between delinquent peer associations and delinquent behavior. It tests the hypothesis, derived from learning and interactional theories, that delinquent peers and delinquent behavior are reciprocally related—delinquent peer associations foster future delinquency, and delinquency increases the likelihood of associating with delinquent peers. It also tests the competing hypothesis, derived from control theories, that delinquent peers do not cause delinquency, but instead, the relationship is (1) spurious due to individual criminal propensity, (2) a result of the effects of delinquent behavior on future associations with delinquent peers, or (3) an artifact of problems of measuring delinquent peers. To test these propositions, we use data from the National Youth Survey and estimate a cross-lagged panel model that corrects for measurement error in indicators of delinquent peers and delinquent behavior. The model species a covariance structure model for ordinal measures. Parameters are estimated by (1) estimating a threshold model relating ordinal measures to continuous latent variables; (2) estimating a matrix of polychoric correlations relating observed variables, and (3) using an asymptotic distribution-free estimator to estimate structural parameters. The results suggest that delinquent peer associations and delinquent behavior are reciprocally related, but the effect of delinquency on peer associations is larger than that of peer associations on delinquency.     

Unintended Consequences: Anticipation of General Election Outcomes And Primary Election Divisiveness

This article offers the first theory to explain the relationship between primary election divisiveness and general election outcomes that is grounded in candidates' own behavior. Conventional wisdom holds that divisive primaries cause candidates to do poorly in general elections. I show that primary divisiveness does not cause this or any other pattern of general election results. Rather, expectations about general election results cause primaries to be divisive. Non‐incumbents enter races they think they can win, and they think they can win where the incumbent is vulnerable. More candidates enter those races than others, splitting the vote among them. This stampede creates divisive primaries in which incumbents are most likely to do poorly, and challengers well, in the general elections. As a result, divisiveness is associated with (but does not cause) better general election performances among challengers and worse performances among incumbents. In this manner, primary divisiveness is an unintended consequence of behavior directed towards the goal of winning the general election. I tested these propositions using data from major‐party House primaries between 1976 and 1998 and found that (a) candidate expectations of victory determine when and where divisive primary elections occur, (b) those expectations drive the correlation between primary divisiveness and general election results, and (c) primary divisiveness correlates with incumbents doing poorly, and challengers well, in general elections.     

Assessing the President's Role as Party Agent in Congressional Elections: The Case of Bill Clinton in 2000

Presidents have become their parties' chief fund‐raisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties' collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed, presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second, either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors) generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome. Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund‐raising efforts during the 1999–2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their unmatched fund‐raising ability to help their parties win congressional contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record also shows that presidential fund‐raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party.     

Why China Will Grow Rich Before It Grows Old

正THE announcement of the relaxation of China’s one child policy created great discussion in China and internationally.But its significance was widely misunderstood.Contrary to myth,the increase in China’s labor supply plays little role in China’s rapid economic growth.In reality,96 percent of China’s economic growth comes from factors other than a rising labor supply.Therefore,there is no reason why China’s economy should slow significantly because China’s working age population stopped growing in 2012.The mistaken view,sometimes expressed,that China will grow old before it becomes rich is therefore the reverse of the reality:China will grow rich before it grows old.To demonstrate clearly why,first the facts will be stated and then their implications analysed.