Electoral rules,corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.     

POLICE INTERVENTION AND THE REPEAT OF DOMESTIC ASSAULT

We use the National Crime Victimization Survey to examine whether domestic violence is less likely to be repeated if it is reported to the police and if the offender is arrested. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that reporting has a fairly strong deterrent effect, whereas the effect of arrest is small and statistically insignificant. We find no support for the hypothesis that offenders retaliate when victims (rather than third parties) call the police or when victims sign complaints. We also find no evidence that the effects of reporting or arrest depend on the seriousness of the offense, a history of violence by the offender or sociodemographic characteristics. Our results suggest that the best policies for deterrence will be those that encourage victims and third parties to report violence by intimate partners to the police.