Effectiveness of private finance initiatives (PFI): study of private financing for the provision of capital assets for schools

The study reported in this paper explores how effective Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have been as critical providers of capital assets within the state education sector in the UK. Specifically, the research investigates the impact on educational provision of the UK government's contentious £43 billion Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The inquiry focuses on 27 English Local Education Authorities (LEAs) currently or recently involved in PFI. The investigation examines the effect of PFI's on LEA decision‐making processes and discusses these authorities assessment of the UK government's current PFI strategy. An evaluation of PFI as a source of sustainable finance is reported as well as recommendations made for LEAs currently considering adoption of PFI. Through such analysis, this study seeks to de‐layer and ascertain the influence of complex external environmental influences and stakeholders that need to be taken into account in order to make PPPs work. The paper concludes by presenting the critical considerations for enhancing the working relationship between private and public sector partners. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation.     

Economic performance and political popularity in the Republic of Ireland

This paper develops a model of discrete choice to analyse the choice of voters among a number of political parties. It then applies the model to an empirical analysis of the relationship between a government's economic performance and its political popularity for the Republic of Ireland over the period 1974–1987.Within this general statement the paper makes three contributions. First, it sheds light on a hitherto unknown phenomenon — namely the nature of the relation between economic performance and political popularity in Ireland. Second, it does this within the context of analysing the reactions of different types of voters viz. voters of all social classes and then of social classes ABC1 and C2DE. Third, the empirical work is grounded firmly in a choice theoretic model involving optimal choices between discrete alternatives.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

Price discrimination in a rent-seeking economy

This paper examines the incentive and the consequences of using discriminatory pricing by a monopolist in a rent-seeking economy. It is shown that, even if all consumer groups' demands have identical elasticities at any given price, the monopolist has an incentive to charge a lower price to high pressure consumer groups so as to alleviate their rent-seeking efforts in challenging its monopolistic power. Furthermore, it is shown that by allowing the firm to price discriminate total welfare may increase, even if all rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful.     

To fight or not to fight?

Public Choice - This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing...     

Explaining differences in productive efficiency: An application to Belgian municipalities

The purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in Belgium. Technical efficiency is evaluated using a non-parametric method based on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) reference technology. We first calculate input, output, and graph Farrell efficiency measures for a cross-section of all 589 Belgian municipalities. In a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment.