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We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final‐passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree‐conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills—results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case. 相似文献
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DONALD RUMSFELD PAUL KENNEDY JOE NYE ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SAMUEL HUNTINGTON FRANCIS FUKUYAMA GEORGE SOROS HILLARY CLINTON BILL CLINTON JOHN POLANYI CHRIS PATTEN JAMES WOLFENSOHN GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO ABDULAZIS OTHMAN ALTWAJIRI HASSAN AL‐TURABI KHALED M. AL‐ANKARY JACK VALENTI AKBAR AHMED KIM DAE JUNG EDWARD SAID JUAN GOYTISOLO ALEJANDRO TOLEDO JOSEPH STIGLITZ DESMOND TUTU 《新观察季刊》2008,25(1):18-21
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Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress, using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9% of the bills signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9% receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5% receive a recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress. 相似文献
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