Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking

Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.     

INVESTIGATING THE NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY

This article challenges the idea that political philosophy must be of peripheral concern in the study of public policy through an exploration of the concept of harm and the debate over aggressive police patrol. This exploration begins with a brief discussion of the ways the concept of harm figures in the justification and administration of police work. It proceeds through an exposition of differing ways the concept of harm can be defined, the normative overtones of these varying definitions, and some of their policy ramifications with regard to police work. Finally, the way conceptual variation figures in policy debate is explored in the context of the debate over aggressive police patrol—the policy of maximizing the surveillance and criminal interception aspects of police activity as a patrol strategy.     

VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement strategies that encourage "voluntary compliance" can improve regulatory efficiency by reducing unnecessary enforcement and compliance costs associated with legal confrontation between firms and agencies. This article analyzes the enforcement dilemma that causes confrontation and describes a "Tit for Tat" strategy capable of increasing socially beneficial cooperation. The strategy requires agencies to be reasonable toward cooperative firms, vengeful toward cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory toward repentant firms. Reforms in this neglected and poorly understood part of the regulatory process could yield considerable social benefits.