A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF DRINKING AND DRIVING: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION,SOCIAL NORMS,AND MORAL COMMITMENTS*

A structural model based upon data from a random sample of 1,000 U.S. drivers accounted for 56% of the variation in alcohol-impaired driving, with total monthly alcohol consumption as the strongest predictor. Significant contributions of age, sex, peer group values, and preference for beer suggested the operation of socialization to group norms. There was a substantial contribution of personal moral commitment against drinking and driving. However, there was no significant inhibitory influence of legal knowledge and perceived arrest risk. These findings are consistent with Andenaes's view that general deterrence should be more broadly construed to include the moral component as well as the fear component of the law     

POLICE DISRESPECT TOWARD THE PUBLIC: AN ENCOUNTER‐BASED ANALYSIS*

We use observations of police encounters with 3,130 suspects in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg to estimate three influences on police disrespect: how suspects behave, their personal characteristics, and the location of the encounter. Logistic regression models show that suspects' behaviors were the most powerful predictors, but the suspect's sex, age, income, and degree of neighborhood disadvantage were also significant. Minority suspects experienced disrespect less often than whites (statistically significant in the hierarchical analysis controlling for degree of neighborhood disadvantage). These effects are concentrated in St. Petersburg, where the chief had made the suppression of police abuses a visible priority. The findings offer partial confirmation of Donald Black's theory of law.     

THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

A missing piece in the literature that links crime and unemployment is an understanding of the proximate causes of joblessness in the lives of individuals. Granovetter has demonstrated with his concept of social embeddedness that early employment contacts can enhance the prospects of getting a job and subsequent occupational mobility. The alternative implication is that youths who are embedded in criminal contexts can become isolated from the likelihood of legitimate adult employment. This has important implications for an understanding of crime and unemployment, for while much of past macro-level research confirms that unemployment leads to crime in the aggregate, the reverse is likely true at the individual level among adolescents and young adults, especially in community settings with serious crime and unemployment problems. The implications of criminal embeddedness are explored in a well-known set of London panel data. Understanding the process of embeddedness is important because it helps to identify points of intervention, such as peer and justice system contacts.     

How to Make Congress Popular

Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is unpopular because it does not measure up to the people's populist expectations. Instead of being the “citizen's legislature” that the people desire, it is an institutionalized legislature with well‐paid, longtime members and an elaborate infrastructure of committees, caucuses, parties, and perquisites. The people, it is alleged, desire more of a voice in the decisions made by Congress, they want congressional procedures to be more open so ordinary people know what is going on in the halls of power, and they want more accountability and more representation of the interests of real people. In this paper, I argue that the enactment of this populist reform agenda would actually make Congress substantially less popular with the people. In other words, I contend that the more Congress gives people voice, accountability, representation, and open, visible procedures, the more the people will be dissatisfied with Congress. The real cause of congressional unpopularity is not that people would rather make decisions themselves but that people do not trust members of Congress to make decisions in a non‐self‐interested fashion.     

MANAGING FINANCIAL STRINGENCY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

This article contributes to the debate about the most effective ways to manage the effects of financial stringency in the public sector. It tentatively draws ideas for further research from three action research studies conducted longitudinally over several years in different contexts and sectors and at different organization levels within the public sector. Our contribution focuses on the management of the early stages of stringency. We conclude that in stringent times, particularly in the short-term, intra-organizational conflict is likely to increase; organizational climates to become more cautious and reactive; and management to become more centralized, controlling and to take what is termed the efficiency rather than the effectiveness option. To these factors is added the resistance to change inherent in professional bureaucracies. Managers in public sector organizations experiencing harsher environments need to be helped to plan strategically for implementation in the particular context in which they find themselves.     

The Limits of the Economic Analysis of Regulation: An Empirical Case and a Case for Empiricism*

Can the tools of the economic analysis of law be used to identify the optimal level of stringency in regulatory standards? Data on the costs of nursing home regulatory compliance suggest that in this domain such models could only produce wildly false estimates of the optimal level of stringency. Among the reasons for this are that: (a) actual costs of compliance explain only 19 percent of the variance in the subjectively expected costs that should inform rational choices; and (b) while there is a powerful effect of expected cost on compliance disaggregated by standard, this is not a monotonic increasing effect but a parabolic relationship. The reason for the finding that almost half the nursing homes lie on the wrong side of the turning point of this parabola is that these homes tend to be run by managers who are “disengagers” from the regulatory culture. Their behavior is not to be understood in terms of rational game playing but in terms of dropping out of the regulatory game. The disengagers are in the regulatory system but not of it and certainly not economically calculative about it.