Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)

How can we tell if an Al Qaeda cell has been broken? That enough members have been captured or killed so that there is a high likelihood they will be unable to carry out a new attack, and military resources can be redirected away from them and toward more immediate threats? This article uses order theory to quantify the degree to which a terrorist network is still able to function. This tool will help law enforcement know when a battle against Al Qaeda has been won, thus saving the public's money without unduly risking the public's safety.‐     

Mind the gap: How party–voter incongruence fuels the entry and support of new parties

This article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual-level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party–voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesise that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Time-series analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support.     

WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS*

This paper reports on a new methodology to estimate the “cost of crime.” It is adapted from the contingent valuation method used in the environmental economics literature and is itself used to estimate the public's willingness to pay for crime control programs. In a nationally representative sample of 1,300 U.S. residents, we found that the typical household would be willing to pay between $100 and $150 per year for programs that reduced specific crimes by 10 percent in their communities. This willingness amounts, collectively, to approximately $25,000 per burglary, $70,000 per serious assault, $232,000 per armed     

Legislative Voting Behavior,Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll‐Call Vote Selection

The empirical study of legislative behavior largely relies on roll‐call vote analysis, but roll‐call votes in many legislatures represent only a sample of legislative votes. We have good reasons to believe this sample is particularly poor for inferring party effects on legislative behavior. The selection of votes for roll call may be endogenous to exactly the characteristics of voting behavior (for instance, party cohesion) that we want to study. We must understand the roll‐call vote institution and account for its selection effects before we can draw inferences about legislative behavior from roll‐call results. This article develops a game‐theoretic model of roll‐call vote requests predicated on party leaders requesting votes to enforce party discipline. The model offers general and testable predictions about the selection process and how it affects observed and unobserved legislative voting behavior, particularly party cohesion.     

THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE IN DANISH SCHOOLS

Many resources have been invested in reforming the public sectors of most countries in the world during the last 20 years. Greater focus on evaluation and performance is one of the most central aspects of these reforms, but despite much academic research virtually no systematic evaluations of the outcome of the reforms themselves are found. This paper presents a study of the effect of performance management reforms of Danish public schools on the achievements of more than 80,000 lower secondary students. The study finds no or very small effects on performance measured as average exam scores, but highly significant effects on inequity in the sense that students with low socioeconomic status perform worse at reforming schools than at similar non‐reforming schools. These results, as well as the methodological challenges involved in estimating reform impact, emphasize the need for more empirical scrutiny of what effects the reforms have.     

POWER-CONTROL THEORY,GENDER, AND DELINQUENCY: A PARTIAL REPLICATION WITH ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PEERS*

This examination of Hagan et al.'s (1985, 1987) power-control theory of delinquency and gender finds that gender and delinquency are related to the relative authority of parents at work in ways unexpected by power-control theory. Support is found, however, for the power-control thesis pertaining to parental control and risk-taking attitudes. In reconciling differences between these findings and those of Hagan et al., the conclusion is that relations of affiliation as well as parental authority are important determinants of delinquency and its relationship with gender.     

A Contagious Concept: Explaining the Spread of Privatization in the Telecommunications Sector

Qualitative studies suggest that the spread of privatization of public utilities is due to a change of the economic paradigm and institutional isomorphism pressures. However, current quantitative studies mostly account for domestic factors. These factors can explain differences in national privatization trajectories but cannot explain the large trend. Based on a quantitative analysis of privatizations in the telecommunications sector in 21 OECD countries, the article argues that emulation pressures can explain the trend toward privatization. The analysis suggests that privatization gained legitimacy as more and more governments emulated privatization policies they observed in countries they perceived as similar. However, the article finds no evidence of cross‐sectoral diffusion. Thus, according to the analysis, telecommunications privatization diffused within the same sector between countries, but not within the same country between different sectors.