POWER-CONTROL THEORY,GENDER, AND DELINQUENCY: A PARTIAL REPLICATION WITH ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PEERS*

This examination of Hagan et al.'s (1985, 1987) power-control theory of delinquency and gender finds that gender and delinquency are related to the relative authority of parents at work in ways unexpected by power-control theory. Support is found, however, for the power-control thesis pertaining to parental control and risk-taking attitudes. In reconciling differences between these findings and those of Hagan et al., the conclusion is that relations of affiliation as well as parental authority are important determinants of delinquency and its relationship with gender.     

A Contagious Concept: Explaining the Spread of Privatization in the Telecommunications Sector

Qualitative studies suggest that the spread of privatization of public utilities is due to a change of the economic paradigm and institutional isomorphism pressures. However, current quantitative studies mostly account for domestic factors. These factors can explain differences in national privatization trajectories but cannot explain the large trend. Based on a quantitative analysis of privatizations in the telecommunications sector in 21 OECD countries, the article argues that emulation pressures can explain the trend toward privatization. The analysis suggests that privatization gained legitimacy as more and more governments emulated privatization policies they observed in countries they perceived as similar. However, the article finds no evidence of cross‐sectoral diffusion. Thus, according to the analysis, telecommunications privatization diffused within the same sector between countries, but not within the same country between different sectors.     

Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item‐response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.     

INSTITUTIONAL AND POSTRELEASE BEHAVIOR OF FURMAN-COMMUTED INMATES IN TEXAS*

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty as administered constituted cruel and unusual punishment. This ruling also invalidated the death sentences of over 600 inmates in the United States, who subsequently had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. This article examines the institutional and postrelease behavior of the 47 Furman inmates in Texas from 1973 to 1986. Prior to the release of these inmates into the general prisoner population, prison officials and clinicians stated that they were dangerous and constituted a substantial threat to other inmates and to the security staff. The institutional and release behavior of the Furman inmates is compared with that of a cohort of like violent offenders. The Furman inmates committed few serious rule violations. They did not kill other inmates or staff. A minority of inmates in both groups committed the majority of prison rule violations. Of the 31 Furman inmates released on parole, 1 committed a new homicide. No cohort inmate killed again. The conclusion is that the execution of these 47 inmates would not have greatly protected society.     

TRANSFORMING NEW ZEALAND'S PUBLIC SECTOR: LABOUR'S QUEST FOR IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Since its election in July 1984 the fourth Labour government in New Zealand has embarked upon the most radical and systematic reorganization of the state sector since the creation of a unified, non-partisan, career-oriented service in 1912. The reforms include the commercialization of many of the goods and services provided by state agencies, the turning of public trading enterprises into corporations, major administrative changes and the overhauling of state pay-fixing arrangements. This article examines the theoretical assumptions underpinning Labour's strategy and assesses the extent to which the new arrangements are likely to achieve their intended purpose of improving the efficiency, flexibility and accountability of the public sector.     

“Grabbing Hand” or “Helping Hand”?: Corruption and the Economic Role of the State

This article seeks to disentangle which features of government intervention are linked to corruption and which are not, by distinguishing between the government roles of regulator, entrepreneur, and consumer. It finds that the degree of regulation of private business activity is the strongest predictor of corruption, and that high levels of public spending are related to low levels of corruption. There is no evidence of direct government involvement in production having any bearing on corruption. It is concluded that advanced welfare capitalist systems, which leave business relatively free from interference while intervening strongly in the distribution of wealth and the provision of key services, combine the most “virtuous” features of “big” and “small” government. This suggests that anti‐corruption campaigners should be relaxed about state intervention in the economy in general, but should specifically target corruption‐inducing regulatory systems.