Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

Abstract. A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.     

"The More Things Change…": Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile Industry

Business litigation is a relatively neglected area of corporate governance, particularly given its enormous rise in the United States over the past generation. As a preliminary effort to engage this issue, we examine dispute avoidance and resolution in the automotive sector since the early 1970s-focusing on relationships between auto manufacturers and their suppliers and dealers. We generally presume intercorporate litigation to be a "last resort" in business practice, chosen only on the breakdown of less costly means of dispute avoidance or resolution; we take such breakdown typically to be caused by shifts in the terms of competition among firms (e. g., increased competition, instability, uncertainty); and we expect that, over time, the costs of litigation will motivate efforts to construct new structures of nonlitigious dispute resolution. In the case of the U. S. auto industry, we find disruptive shifts in the terms of competition and increased recourse to litigation. Throughout, however, this litigation effect is mitigated by the dominance of major manufacturers over their suppliers and dealers. Over time, it is further dampened by industry development of mechanisms for arbitration or other nonlitigious dispute resolution.     

The Global Workplace—challenging the race to the bottom

Founded in 1951, War on Want is a UK‐based NGO committed to the alleviation of poverty with strong roots in the labour movement. War on Want's programme on the Global Workplace provides trade unionists with a range of practical skills and knowledge about international development issues. Part of the programme involves a ‘Global Workers' Forum’, which takes grassroots trade union activists from the UK to a similar sector or even a plant owned by the same employer in the South. The aim is to enhance participants' understanding of the impact of globalisation on the industries in which they work, establish relationships that can act as starting points for global action, and encourage participants to spread the message within their own unions. There is also a website which raises awareness of the global economy and encourages activists to make links and undertake joint action. It is essential that now, as never before, trade unionists should work together as an international force to challenge globalisation and fight for the recognition of workers' rights. The Global Workplace suggests that showing global solidarity to workers around the world can help trade unionists rise to this challenge.     

Fear of Gang Crime: A Look at Three Theoretical Models

Gang crime and resulting public fear became a major policy focus during the 1990s, yet few studies specifically focus on fear of gang crime. Guided by social disorganization theory, we test three theoretical models about the individual thought processes leading to fear of gang crime. Using structural equation models, we find that each of these three theories—diversity, disorder, and community concern—is an important predictor of gang-related fear. In addition, we find that the indirect relationships between demographic characteristics, theoretical variables, and fear depend upon which model is tested.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960-62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion 'neutralism' in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

From-Long Term To Short-Term Contracting

One can look at the arrival of New Public Management and the extensive public sector reforms inspired by this theory from many angles. Here we examine the shift from long-term contracting, typical of bureaucracy and traditional enterprises, to short-term contracting, borrowed from private sector governance methods. Short-term contracting has three principal uses in the governance of the public sector: (a) contracting with service providers after a tendering/bidding process; (b) contracting with the CEOs of the incorporated public enterprises; and (c) contracting with executive agencies about what they should deliver. Theoretical analysis, supported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that short-term contracting eliminates the extensive post-contractual opportunism connected with long-term contracting, but is vulnerable to precontractual opportunism. Short-term contracting is not just another public sector reform fad, but constitutes a new tool for government which increases efficiency when handled with prudence.     

“The Politics of Political Advertising” in Australia and Britain, 1970–1989

The role of advertising in the production of political campaigns deserves more consideration than it has previously received. My study examines advertising agencies associated with election campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s, investigating their decisions to accept or reject political accounts. Focusing on Britain and Australia, and using a range of primary sources including the industry press, interviews and memoirs, I demonstrate that an agency's decision to accept a political account is always complex, contested and highly contingent. Accepting a political account may alienate clients and agency staff who support another party. Campaigns are labour‐intensive and may detract from an agency's core business. Involvement in a losing campaign can damage an agency's reputation, just as association with a successful one may attract clients. Agencies are often unsure how to approach political advertising where traditional techniques may not be suitable. Such concerns about accepting a political account will likely be put aside where an agency principal has close personal ties to a party or leader.