The modern conception of the ``Rule of Law'' entails government bylaw not men, and takes law to consist in rules known in advance. Thislatter characteristic assumes that, for the most part, the meaningof such rules is unproblematic (Hart's ``core of settled meaning''), this usually being understood as a function of ``literal meaning''.A quite different model exists in the Bible: the early rules display``oral residue'', and their meaning, I argue, is constructed in``narrative'' rather than ``semantic'' terms: instead of asking:``what situations do the words of this rule cover?'', we shouldinquire: ``what typical situations do the words of this rule evoke?''.Moreover, courtroom adjudication was not the norm, and its originalform was not based upon the application of written rules but ratherupon judicial discretion taken to have been divinely inspired. Isuggest that modern jurisprudence still retains traces of such earlierconceptions, in its account of modern law: despite their differences, both Hart and Fuller make use of narrative constructions of meaning,and Kelsen ultimately prefers the authority of the judge to the correctness of the rule he purports to apply.
Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed. 相似文献
Many communities are developing civic computer networks to provide citizens with free access to local information resources and the Internet. However, most networks restrict both commercial speech and any language deemed “objectionable.”; Whether such broad discretionary power violates the First Amendment depends on whether the networks are state actors. An examination of one such network, Alachua Free‐Net, reveals a close symbiotic relationship between the network and several local government entities. Symbiotic relationships between the state and a private party in other contexts have been held by the courts to constitute state action. Thus, Alachua Free‐Net appears to be a state actor and must conform its speech restrictions to the requirements of the First Amendment. Moreover, whether state actors or not, civic computer networks such as Alachua Free‐Net should commit themselves to providing full First Amendment freedoms to their users. 相似文献
In terrorist operations, weapons technologies are the tools groups use to pursue their violent ends. Because of differences in what they can do, different weapons are useful for different types of operations. Using a random sample of terrorist incidents from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, this article explores (1) how terrorists in general used particular weapons technologies and (2) the variation in the technology choices of individual terrorist groups. The results demonstrate significant differences in the ways different weapons are used, in the versatility of individual technologies, and among the technology strategies of different terrorist organizations. 相似文献
We argue that personal belief exemptions to the mandate for childhood immunizations should not be allowed. Parents who choose not to immunize their children put both their own children and other children at risk. Other children are at risk because unimmunized children go to school or day care when they are contagious but asymptomatic, exposing many more children to potentially dangerous infections. The risks to children from disease are much higher than the risks of vaccines. There are, of course, some bona fide reasons why children should not be immunized. Some children have known allergies or other medical contraindications to certain immunizations. Immunization refusals based on parental beliefs, however, do not fall into this category. In those cases, children are denied the protection of immunizations without any medical or scientific justification. By eliminating personal belief exemptions to those childhood vaccines associated with contagious diseases that have high rates of childhood mortality, we would better protect children and would more fairly spread the burdens of this important public health program. 相似文献