Is there a magical time boundary for diagnosing eyewitness identification accuracy in sequential line‐ups?

We examined whether eyewitness identification latencies for sequential line‐up decisions indicate an optimum time boundary that reliably discriminates accurate from inaccurate decisions. Participants (N = 381) observed a crime simulation and attempted two separate identifications from target‐present or target‐absent sequential line‐ups. As has previously been found with simultaneous line‐ups, the optimum time boundary identified did not reliably discriminate accurate from inaccurate identifications for both line‐up targets. Diagnosticity for choosers was, however, much higher at very high confidence levels than at lower levels. Possible reasons for why one index of signal strength (confidence), but not another (latency), might postdict accuracy within the sequential framework were presented.     

Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics

As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.     

An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law

The international law of state responsibility determines whenstates are liable for international law violations. States aregenerally liable when they have control over the actions ofwrongdoers; thus, the actions of state officials can implicatestate responsibility whereas the acts of private citizens usuallydo not. We argue that the rules of state responsibility havean economic logic similar to that of vicarious liability indomestic law: the law in both cases provides third parties withincentives to control the behavior of wrongdoers whom they canmonitor and influence. We also discuss international legal remediesand individual liability under international criminal law.