China's Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages

Abstract

China's position in the world economy during the past half-century provides vital information for investigating the relation between politics and trade. Although there is a substantial number of studies in this area, the current study extends the literature in at least three ways: (1) it is one of the first studies that investigates the problem of a potential sample selection bias—as a result of the fact that countries taken up in the analysis are not randomly sampled from all countries in the world; (2) it considers third-country effects that follow from the fact that China's relation with any two countries is affected by the relation between these countries themselves; and (3) it tests the impact of five political arrangements simultaneously, which is more comprehensive than any former study. By using data as to 78 of China's trade partners over the 1950–2002 period, this study provides empirical evidence for the hypotheses that the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation, visits of heads of states and political system similarity are associated with greater trade flows. The hypothesis that member countries of a Preferential Trading Agreement have had smaller trade flows with China, which is no member of any of these Preferential Trading Agreements, is not supported by the results.     

Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Living with a nuclear-armed enemy is unattractive, but, strangely, states seldom use their military power to prevent the enemy’s entry into the nuclear club. It is puzzling why preventive strikes against nuclear programs have been quite rare. I address this puzzle by considering the role of conventional retaliation, a subfield of deterrence that so far has received scant attention in the literature. I theorize the concept of conventional retaliation and test its explanatory power. First, I explore all historical cases where states struck another state’s nuclear installations and find none occurring when the proliferator threatened conventional retaliation. Second, I explore two cases where a strike was most likely, but the would-be attacker balked and find smoking-gun evidence that the threat of conventional retaliation restrained the would-be attacker. This evidence supports my claim that the threat of conventional retaliation is sufficient to deter a preventive strike against emerging nuclear states.     

KOMMUNIKASIE EN DIE DEMOKRATISERING VAN TELEVISIE

SEKER die standhoudendste definisie van kommunikasie is al daardie opvattings wat verband hou met die ideale van die demokrasie. Ons begrip van kommunikasie is sedert die negentiende eeu vol van die voornemens van die goeie demokraat: daardie romantiese siening van die individu se betrokke oorgawe aan die samelewing. Kommunikasie het'n baie handige begrip geword om die individu se deelname en inspraak, sy medeseggenskap en medeleelsaamheid, kortom, sy maatskaplike betrokkenheid, ideologies te regverdig. Vandaar al die goeie bedoelings met kommunikasie van almal wat maar iets te sê het oor hedendaagse maatskaplike toestande en die begrip populariseer met selfversekerde uitsprake dat kommunikasie en demokrasie dieselfde is.