Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the US Senate

We examine congressional cue‐taking theory to determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US Senate. Using a novel data‐collection technique (timed C‐SPAN footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis. Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority generally predict cue‐giving, while other types of characteristics predict cue‐giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when studying congressional behavior.     

Lawyers' Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a “Political” Institution?

Do legal elites—lawyers admitted to federal appellate bars—perceive the Supreme Court as a “political” institution? Legal elites differentiate themselves from the mass public in the amount and sources of information about the Court. They also hold near‐universal perceptions of Court legitimacy, a result we use to derive competing theoretical expectations regarding the impact of ideological disagreement on various Court perceptions. Survey data show that many legal elites perceive the Court as political in its decision making, while a minority perceive the Court as activist and influenced by external political forces. Ideological disagreement with the Court's outputs significantly elevates political perceptions of decision making, while it exhibits a null and moderate impact on perceptions of activism and external political influence, respectively. To justify negative affect derived from ideological disagreement, elites highlight the political aspects of the Court's decision making rather than engage in “global delegitimization” of the institution itself.     

Corruption and Political Culture in America: An Empirical Perspective

Political culture helps define the boundaries of permissiblepolitical action. Thus, it should affect the amounts and typesof political corruption occurring in political systems, as wellas responses to corruption when it is discovered. This articlecompares the distribution of corruption convictions among federaljudicial districts over a three-year period to social and politicalcharacteristics of the districts, and to scaled measures ofElazar's moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic politicalsubcultures. Nationally, strong moralistic subcultures and highvoter turnouts are associated with numerous convictions, bothbefore and after district population is controlled. Analysisof regional patterns reveals a different model in the South,however, one suggesting ideas about the dynamics of traditionalisticpolitics. Corruption, and the impact of federal laws againstit, are best understood within their political and culturalsettings. ^* I am indebted to George Calafut and Philip Sidel of the SocialScience Computer Research Institute, University of Pittsburgh,who gave me many hours of assistance in assembling data. LeonardKuntz and William Nelson of the Universitys Office of Research,Father Bernard Quinn of the Glenmary Research Center, and WilliamNewman of the University of Connecticut helped me locate religiouscensus results. The County and City Data Book is published ontape by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and SocialResearch. Daniel J. Elazar, Michael Margolis, Bert A. Rockman,and two anonymous referees gave me extremely helpful commentson this study.     

Spatial continuity and individual variability: A review of recent work on the geography of electoral change

Analyses have shown that the results of a series of general elections display considerable stability in the geography of voting patterns over time. Further, it has been suggested that the change between two electrons is similar in all places. This paper challenges the latter findings, using data from Great Britain and New Zealand. It is shown that even if there were a pattern of uniform swing, this would be produced by spatial variations in voter transition matrices. A review of analyses of those variations suggests the important roles of the neighbourhood effect, campaign spending, tactical voting, sectional effects, and migration as influences on voter behaviour.     

Repeat victimization among adolescents and young adults

Prior research has shown that victimization incidents are disproportionately concentrated among relatively few victims and that prior victimization is a consistent predictor of future risk. This paper expands existing knowledge on victimization by describing temporal patterns of risk and by developing and testing alternative explanatory models of the link between past and future risk. Analyses based on panel data from the National Youth Survey support both state dependence and heterogeneity interpretations of the correlation in risk over time. In other words, prior victimization predicts future risk in part because it alters something about the individual, and because it indicates an unmeasured propensity for victimization that persists over time. The theoretical implications of these findings, including the feasibility of a victim labeling perspective, are discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Phoenix, 1993.An exception to this lack of attention is the vast literature in the area of domestic abuse.     

State support under the new federalism

The new federalism will reduce total intergovernmental revenues to local governments. The reduction will be due to both the transfer to the states of much of the federal aid which previously flowed directly to local governments and reductions in total federal aid levels. Pass-through requirements on the shifted aid will not affect this general result but may soften the impact in many states. Because of differences in the extent to which state governments substitute federal pass-through aid for state aid from own-source revenues and in the degree to which different sources of revenues are treated differently by the states, local revenue reductions will vary greatly from state to state. The losses for local governments will range from 100% of the shifted aid in some states to as little as 15–20% in others.