Can Cohort Replacement Explain Changes in the Relationship Between Age and Homicide Offending?

This paper focuses on shifts in the age distribution of homicide offending in the United States. This distribution remained remarkably stable with small but significant changes over a long period of time. Then between 1985 and 1990 the rates of homicide offending doubled for 15-to-19 year olds and increased nearly 40% for 20-to-24 year olds, while the homicide offending rates decreased for those over 30. In addition to this “epidemic of youth homicide,” which lasted through the mid-1990s, there have been systematic changes in the age distribution of homicide in the United States associated with cohort replacement over the past 40 years. We introduce an estimable function approach for estimating the effects of age, period, and cohort. The method allows us to assess simultaneously the impacts of periods and cohorts on the age distribution of homicide offending. We find that although the age curve remains relatively stable, there are shifts in it associated systematically with cohort replacement. Cohort replacement accounts for nearly half of the upturn in youth homicides during the epidemic of youth homicides, but a significant fraction of that upturn is not associated with cohort replacement.

The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile

In this article, we argue that when patron‐client relations are grounded in economic relationships, such as between landlord and worker, we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy, the state, and the political system work, but also how the economy works. We develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed. Landlords/patrons provide economic rents to workers, and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords. As votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents, vote control increases the demand for labor and for land. The model implies that the introduction of the Australian ballot, which destroys this form of clientelism, should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron‐client relationships are strongest. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in Chile around May 31, 1958, for which we collected original data. A characteristic of rural Chile at this time were patron‐client relations based on the inquilinaje system, by which a worker, the inquilino, entered into a long‐term, often hereditary, employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord’s estate. We show that the introduction of the Australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26% in land prices in the areas where these patron‐client relationships were predominant.     

The Mills report,the Manley subsidy proposals,and the business of major‐league sport

Abstract: This article examines the debates over subsidies to professional sports teams that have been the focus of much attention and passion in Canada over the past several years, debates that led to the report by Dennis Mills,Sport in Canada: Everybody's Business, and to John Manley's ill‐fated proposals to offer subsidies to Canadian professional sports operators. The article reviews the arguments put forward by the sports industry: that major‐league hockey and baseball teams make substantial economic contributions, both directly and indirectly, to the cities in which they are located and that Canadian teams, especially those based in smaller cities, need substantial reductions in their public costs (taxes and/or rents) in order to “level the playing field” with their US. competitors. The authors argue that the commissioned studies on which these claims are based systematically overstate the economic impacts of professional sports and are not supported by independent research. The authors also argue that the difficulties facing Canada's “small market” teams are not primarily the result of higher taxes; rather, they follow from changes in the sports industry over the last decade (notably, much higher player salaries). This means that in order to remain competitive, teams must be able to generate far greater revenues than were needed only a decade ago. When one examines the new economy of professional hockey, in particular, with its heavy reliance on local television and advertising revenues and on the purchase of luxury seating by the local corporate sector, it is hard to avoid concluding that even with public subsidies teams based in provincial Canadian cities may no longer be able to compete in the major leagues. Finally, the authors consider the cultural argument that nhl hockey is a Canadian tradition and warrants support on “heritage,” as opposed to economic, grounds. However, the authors conclude that both professional sports and Canada have changed so much in recent decades that commercial sport is not an appropriate candidate for public subsidy. Sommaire: Dans cet article, on examine la question des subventions aux équipes de sports professionnels qui a fait l'objet d'un vif débat au Canada au cours de ces dern‐ières années. Ce débat avait entraîné le rapport de Dennis Mills,Sport in Canada: Everybody's Business, et les propositions soumises ans succès par John Manley pour offrir des subventions aux exploitants de sports professionnels au Canada. On y présente les arguments du secteur des sports: les équipes de hockey et de baseball des ligues majeures font un apport économique direct et indirect considérable aux villes oú elles se trouvent, et les équipes canadiennes, surtout celles basées dans des villes plus petites, ont besoin d'une réduction substantielle de leurs coûts publics (impôts et/ou loyers) afin d'égaliser le terrain de jeu par rapport à leurs concurrents américains. Selon les auteurs, les études commanditées qui justifient ces prétentions exagèrent systématiquement les retombées économiques des sports professionnels et elles ne sont pas appuyées par des recherche indépendeants. Par ailleurs, les difficultées auxquelles font face les équipes de petit marché au Canada ne découlent pas d'une forte impositoin mais plutôt de l'évolution survenue dans l'industrie du sport au cows de cette dernière décennie (notamment, la forte hausse du salaire des joueurs). Pour rester concurrentielles, les équipes doivent recueillir un revenue très supérieur à celui d'il y a dix ans. Lorsqu'on examine la nouvelle économie du hockey professionnel en particulier, fortement tributaire du revenue prodigué par la télévision et la publicité locales et de l'achat de siges au prix fort par les entreprises de la localité, il est difficile d'éviter la conclusion que, même avec des subventions publiques, les équipes basées dans des villes provinciales au Canada auront du mal à survivre dans les lques majeures. Enfin, les auteurs examinent l'argument culturel voulant que le hockey de la lnh soit une tradition canadienne qui mérite d'être appuyée à titre patrimonial plutôt qu'économique. Leur conclusion: les sports professionnels et le pays lui‐même ont tellement évolué ces dernières décennies que le sport commercial n'est pas un candidat valable pour des subventions publiques.     

La diffusion d'une innovation portant les germes de son plafonnement: la réutilisation des hémodialyseurs au Québec

Sommaire: L'objectif de cette recherche est d'identifier les facteurs de diffusion d'une innovation ‐ la réutilisation des hémodialyseurs (rh) ‐ ainsi que de son plafonncment marqué par la controverse, à travers les motivations et stratégies des groupes d'acteurs clés. Plus particulièrement, cette étude vise à situer le rôle de la “ médecine fondée sur des données probantes ”dans la dynamique de la diffusion de cette innovation. Nous partons du constat que la rh est une pratique reconnue pour les économies qu'elle génère tout en étant perçue par certains comme risquée pour la santé des usagers et du personnel. Les résultats de notre étude montrent que la diffusion de la rh au Québec, loin d'avoir pris son assise sur des données empiriques solides, a plutôt résulté de comportements sociaux d'imitation à la faveur de contacts directs entre des centres de dialyse voisins qui subissaient alors de fortes pressions de leurs autorités afin de réduire leurs dépenses. Cependant, l'ampleur des investissements nécessaires à l'introduction de cette pratique, la perspective de devoir négocicr I'achat de matériel dédiéà la rh auprès d'un monopole, ainsi que les stratégies commerciales de fournisseurs peu motivés à promouvoir la vente de matériel de rh au détriment de celle, plus lucrative, d'hémodialyseurs en grande quantité (lorsque non réutilisés), ont grandement réduit l'attrait économique dc la rh aux yeux des dirigeants de centres de dialyse. L'incapacité des données empiriques à endiguer les craintes soulevées par les risques associés à la rh a eu la double conséquence (1) dc mener au plafonnement de cette activité et (2) d'induire des centres de dialysc qui effectuaient déjà la rh à se doter d'une gestion envers les patients basée sur la non transparence et la contrainte. Sur le plan conceptuel, les résultats de cette étude montrent que ce n'est que dans la mesure où les facteurs sociaux et d'intérêts (dynamiquc institutionnelle) sont pris en compte et qu'ils convergent avec les critères de rationalité technique, qu'une innovation améliore ses chances de se diffuser et de s'enraciner dans une organisation. Considérant ces conclusions, quelques propositions sont énonées dans le but d'améliorer le potentiel d'implantation de la rh en facilitant la prise en compte des données empiriques dans les centres de dialyse, tout en leur procurant un meilleur rapport de force vis‐à‐vis leurs fournisseurs et afin que les patients et le personnel clinique y trouvent davantage leur intérêt. Abstract: The purpose of this research is to identify the factors in the diffusion of an innovation ‐ hemodialyzer re‐use ‐ and the controversy surrounding the levelling off of its use, by looking at the motivations and strategies of key actors. More particularly, this study focuses on the role of “evidence‐based medicine” in the diffusion of this innovation. Starting with the observation that hemodialyzer re‐use is recognized for its cost‐savings while being perceived by some to be a health risk for both users and staff, our findings show that diffusion of this practice in Quebec, far from being based on solid empirical data, was instead influenced by the social phenomenon of imitation that resulted from direct contact with local dialysis centres that were at the time under great pressure from their management to reduce expenditures. The cost‐savings of hemodialyzer re‐use for the people managing the dialysis centres was, however, greatly reduced by several factors: the considerable investments needed to introduce this practice; the prospects of having to negotiate with a monopoly to purchase the hemodialyzer‐dedicated equipment; and the commercial strategies of suppliers who have little interest in promoting the sale of equipment for hemodialyzer re‐use over the more lucrative sale of large quantities of hemodialyzers (when not re‐used). The ineffectiveness of empirical data in allaying fears of the risks associated with the practice of hemodialyzer re‐use has had the dual effect of 1) causing this activity to level off, and 2) causing dialysis centres already involved in hemodialyzer re‐use to adopt an approach to patient management that is based on non‐transparency and constraint. On the conceptual level, our findings show that the likelihood of an organization adopting an innovation increases when social factors and interest factors (such as the institutional dynamic) are taken into account and align with criteria of technical rationality. Given these conclusions, we put forward some proposals for improving the potential of hemodialyzer re‐use by facilitating the dialysis centres' consideration of empirical data. As well, our proposals are aimed at obtaining a stronger position for the centres with regard to their suppliers and at ensuring that both patients and clinic staff benefit more from the practice of hemodialyzer re‐use.