Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison

Meta-analysis is used to compare identification accuracy rates in showups and lineups. Eight papers were located, providing 12 tests of the hypothesis and including 3013 participants. Results indicate that showups generate lower choosing rates than lineups. In target present conditions, showups and lineups yield approximately equal hit rates, and in target absent conditions, showups produce a significantly higher level of correct rejections. False identification rates are approximately equal in showups and lineups when lineup foil choices are excluded from analysis. Dangerous false identifications are more numerous for showups when an innocent suspect resembles the perpetrator. Function of lineup foils, assessment strategies for false identifications, and the potential impact of biases in lineup practice are suggested as additional considerations in evaluation of showup versus lineup efficacy.     

Crime control in the 2000 presidential election: A symbolic issue

Presidential candidates regularly use crime issues to help win electoral support. Contrary to conventional wisdom, crime control also became an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. Despite decreasing crime rates, the debate was driven by public opinion. Because the crime debate was fueled by perception rather than reality, it is argued that the symbolic nature of the debate became important in providing reassurance to the American public. This finding points to the importance of symbolic rhetoric by presidential candidates in appealing to voters and increasing public support.     

SUPERVISED VISITATION A Profile of Providers

Surveys with 94 administrators of supervised visitation programs, 51 family court judges, and 40 administrators of child protective services agencies provide a national picture of supervised visitation services, their utility, and areas of unmet need. Although the programs are perceived to fill an important need, they struggle to survive financially, particularly those that handle family court cases. In addition, because many programs operate without adequate access to the assessment and treatment services that some families need, judges frequently want visitation supervisors to assist them in determining suitable custody and visitation arrangements, a role that supervised visitation programs do not feel is appropriate. Many different types of entities provide effective supervised visitation services; many different service formats work. Architects of new programs should fashion services that use local resources to maximum advantage.     

Public choice in a federal system

Except for the mobility constraints imposed on political decisions of lower-level governments, public choice analysts assume that the working of the political process under federalism remains the same at all levels of governments as under unitary state. This paper argues that one dimension of the political process in a federalist framework lends itself to specific economic analysis, namely the fact that, once constitutional limits break down and functions overlap, two or more levels of government compete for the same voters in the supply of services in a given territory. Viewing votes as inputs in the production of political outputs, the conventional analysis of allocation under common-property rule should shed light on the outcome of this process. The analysis shows that it is in the interest of both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in being first to implement programs. There are thus two forces operating in a typical federalist system, an expansionist one rooted in the political dynamics analysed here, and a restrictionist one based on the mobility of resources among decentralized entities. This may explain why the empirical record is rather mixed on the contribution of federalism to containing government growth. The consequences of this process are derived and possible avenues for improvement are explored.     

Bureaucratic tenure and economic performance in centrally planned economies

Murrell and Olson (1991) set forth the hypothesis that in centrally planned economies economic interests over time become fragmented as bureaus become more autonomous and form into narrowly-based distributional coalitions. As a consequence, the national leader's encompassing interest in economic growth becomes compromised and growth begins to slow. This paper provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that growing bureaucratic autonomy results in declining economic growth in centrally planned economies.