Closing the Rhetoric‐Reality Gap? Employees' Perspective of Performance Management in the Australian Public Service

Performance management has been hailed by its proponents as an essential tool to enhance public service performance. Yet, its actual capacity to improve public service performance continues to be questioned by many academics. This research on a small group of Australian Public Service employees examines their perceptions on the efficacy of the performance management system in their agencies. The study respondents did not believe that their work behaviours had significantly changed in response to performance management. Obstacles to high performance include perceptions of a poorly designed performance measurement system, an inadequate level and mix of rewards offered, and inconsistencies in the implementation process.     

The usefulness of key performance indicators to public accountability authorities in East Asia

Has the mandated reporting of key performance indicators (KPIs) by public agencies to public accountability or reporting authorities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore helped these authorities in their task to hold the agencies to account? This article argues that the sheer existence of KPIs in public agencies' annual reports and budget papers does not automatically lead to their effective use by the authorities for making decisions about the agencies' performance achievements. The utilization of KPIs for making decisions by the participating authorities in these countries could be best described as careful and cautious because of their perceptions that the KPIs have failed to meet their performance information needs. Since the implementation of a performance measurement and reporting system has been linked to both instrumental and symbolic benefits, perhaps the main value of the current systems lies less with their ability to bring about instrumental benefits to reporting authorities and other stakeholders. Instead, their primary strength may be skewed towards their capacity to accrue symbolic benefits for the government. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Graduates' Views on Working in the Public Sector: A Comparative Analysis of the Three Tiers of Government

Why do university graduates choose to work for one level of government but not the others? This article examines the comparative appeal of government jobs across the three tiers of government – federal, state and local – in Australia. When asked to indicate their employer of choice, a majority of graduates in this case study ranked the federal and state governments close to each other. This article also compares and analyses the pre‐employment views and motivations of the graduates with varying interests in working for the different tiers of government.     

Performance Study of a Score‐based Likelihood Ratio System for Forensic Fingermark Comparison

In this article, the performance of a score‐based likelihood ratio (LR) system for comparisons of fingerprints with fingermarks is studied. The system is based on an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) comparison algorithm and focuses on fingerprint comparisons where the fingermarks contain 6–11 minutiae. The hypotheses under consideration are evaluated at the level of the person, not the finger. The LRs are presented with bootstrap intervals indicating the sampling uncertainty involved. Several aspects of the performance are measured: leave‐one‐out cross‐validation is applied, and rates of misleading evidence are studied in two ways. A simulation study is performed to study the coverage of the bootstrap intervals. The results indicate that the evidential strength for same source comparisons that do not meet the Dutch twelve‐point standard may be substantial. The methods used can be generalized to measure the performance of score‐based LR systems in other fields of forensic science.     

Blunt force regulation and bureaucratic control: Understanding China's war on pollution

In the past decade, China has increasingly resorted to top‐down, “blunt force” solutions to environmental problems; officials forcibly shutter or destroy factories to reduce pollution, at immense cost to local growth and employment. Why would a high capacity state like China resort to such a costly method of pollution control? I argue that blunt force enforcement is targeted at overcoming principal–agent problems in the bureaucracy. When institutions are too weak to hold bureaucrats accountable, political leaders increase oversight by drastically reducing the number of steps and resources required to produce a regulatory outcome—resulting in blunt force measures. I illustrate this logic through case studies from China's multiyear war on pollution. Using original data on blunt force measures, I then show how localities with lower bureaucratic compliance face greater blunt force pollution enforcement. These findings reveal that when bureaucratic accountability is weak, states pay a very high cost for cleaner air.     

A Preliminary Theory of Informal Accountability among Network Organizational Actors

Widespread government contracting for nonprofit social service delivery has resulted in extensive reliance on networks of service providers, which involve complicated accountability dynamics. The literature has tended to emphasize formal aspects of accountability in contract relationships, focusing on the specification of contract terms, performance measures, reporting relationships, and stipulated consequences. Far less attention has been focused on the interorganizational and interpersonal behaviors that reflect informal accountability. This article examines the informal norms, expectations, and behaviors that facilitate collective action and promote informal accountability among nonprofit network actors. The data are based on in‐depth interviews with nonprofit senior administrators in four major metropolitan areas. Based on this research, the authors propose a preliminary theory of informal accountability that links (1) the shared norms and facilitative behaviors that foster informal accountability for collective outcomes, (2) the informal system of rewards and sanctions used to promote and reinforce behavioral expectations, and (3) the challenges that may undermine informal accountability.