Missing revolution: the American intelligence failure in Iraq, 1958

Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq’s ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America’s intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.     

Portfolio models and planning for export diversification: Malawi,Tanzania and Zimbabwe

Evidence is presented regarding strengths and limitations of portfolio approaches as applied to diversifying export earnings. An empirical application using data from Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe is used to demonstrate these strengths and limitations. Modifications of the typical portfolio approach to export diversification are presented; these modifications help make the approach more plausible for use in developing countries. The modified approach is shown to provide guidance to policymakers who seek simultaneously to increase export earnings and reduce their instability.     

Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks,the Ethiopia Imperative,and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts

The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia.     

The Common Law and the Forms of Reasoning

The purpose of this article is to examine how various forms of reasoning both can and should be used to decide cases in the common law tradition. I start by separating positive questions about what the law is from normative questions about what the law ought to be. Next, I present a Peircean account of three main forms of reasoning – deduction, induction and abduction – and examine how they can be used by judges to decide cases in the common law. Finally, I argue that the three forms of reasoning can be used to answer both kinds of questions, but in different ways. All three forms of reasoning can be used to answer questions of positive law, while questions of normative law present a special case that may require the use of aesthetic judgments of taste in the formation of a legal hypothesis.     

Low-level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Lessons Learned from Theory and Practice

The interstate compact as a policy tool has a long history ofuse in the United States. Yet some observers feel that interstatecompacts have never lived up to their potential. Nevertheless,in 1980, the compact was chosen as the policy instrument tosolve one of the thorniest environmental policy issues of thedecade: the siting of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposalfacilities. Drawing from research on interstate compacts andon alliance theory developed in international relations, thisarticle applies five key questions to the case of LLRW: Whydo states join compacts? Which compacts will they join? Howstable are the compacts? How important are outside factors?What types of situations are compacts most suited to address?It concludes with lessons that should be useful to future policymakersabout the use of interstate compacts to solve salient, nationwidepolicy problems.