Bureaupreneurs in China: we did it our way

This article explores the different and sometimes conflicting explanations of the success of the collective enterprises (town–village-enterprise) in China during the first phase of transition (1979–1995). It is argued that explanations, relying on cultural variables are not sustainable and this for two reasons. First, the importance of the collective enterprise is shrinking while the private sector is clearly on the rise. Second, other factors, referring to characteristics of the local and central political, administrative and economic environment, in which the Chinese enterprise has to (had to?) operate, provide for a sufficient explanation of the peculiar structure of the Chinese collective enterprises. These enterprises are seen as the result of ?bureau-preneurship’ because local bureaucrats were integrated in their management in order to pre-empt predatory behaviour and to facilitate the relationships with the central institutions. The article contributes to the property rights’ theory of the firm as it analyses an empirically very important case in which firms with unclear property rights and structures, apparently not conducive for incentives, might still be the most efficient option.     

GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS

In recent years, legislators in all fifty states have given grandparents rights to petition for visitation privileges with grandchildren that can be enforced over parental objections. Grandparent visitation rights reflect an effort to protect meaningful relationships children enjoy with nonparental caregivers, enlist the assistance of extended family when the child's nuclear family is disrupted, and defend the interests of grandparents themselves. This psycholegal analysis explores the direct and indirect consequences of grandparent visitation statutes for family functioning. Statutory provisions are summarized, and the effects of these statutes are evaluated in light of what is known about the role of grandparents in child development, how courts evaluate children's "best interests" in grandparent visitation disputes, and how these statutes can alter family functioning in informal ways. The authors conclude that there are risks as well as benefits to children and families in grandparent visitation statutes, and suggest directions for procedural and statutory reform.     

FAMILY COURT REFORM IN SIX PENNSYLVANIA COUNTIES

This article describes judicial behavior in local family court reform movements, vis-à-vis six case studies, as part of a larger study on the implementation of court-connected custody mediation in Pennsylvania. Research findings provide new insight into the initiation of change by judges at the local court level. When motivated to do so, family court judges in Pennsylvania bring about local reform independently and expeditiously. Judges who desire alternative methods to litigation of custody disputes implement court change with few organizational constraints: They decide how and when reform is to be implemented, and they assign nonjudicial professionals to assist in reform implementation. Finally, judges establish their own criteria for assessing the success of change initiated. Throughout reform movements, judges take on a variety of roles in bringing about change—first as reform activists, then as leaders in reform movements, and finally, as advisors in reform implementation. These case studies reveal the diversity in judicial style when court change is implemented; at the same time, similar court goals and objectives are obtained.     

Irrelevance of the soft budget constraint for the shortage phenomenon

Kornai's thesis that shortage results from demand expansions bred by the soft budget constraint, derives from his implicit assumption that price regimes of input and output firms are different. Since any firm is both an input and an output firm, which discards the assumption as logically untenable, excess demand can only turn up because of lower than contracted inputs of labor and management that are not offset by an adequate downward adjustment of earnings. Expansions of demand that appear to be autonomous, are incited by uncertain deliveries of inputs, that is, by inefficiency (of output firms) as well. A by far the largest part of excess demand can be explained by state preferences for fast growth. As planners are more successful in generating investment, and the ensuing consumer, demand than in expanding production, shortage is inevitable regardless of the character of the firms' budget constraints.