Oxytocin and the Biological Basis for Interpersonal and Political Trust

Political scientists have documented the many ways in which trust influences attitudes and behaviors that are important for the legitimacy and stability of democratic political systems. They have also explored the social, economic, and political factors that tend to increase levels of trust in others, in political figures, and in government. Neuroeconomic studies have shown that the neuroactive hormone oxytocin, a peptide that plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation in non-human mammals, is associated with trust and reciprocity in humans (e.g., Kosfeld et al., Nature 435:673–676, 2005; Zak et al., Horm Beh 48:522–527, 2005). While oxytocin has been linked to indicators of interpersonal trust, we do not know if it extends to trust in government actors and institutions. In order to explore these relationships, we conducted an experiment in which subjects were randomly assigned to receive a placebo or 40 IU of oxytocin administered intranasally. We show that manipulating oxytocin increases individuals’ interpersonal trust. It also has effects on trust in political figures and in government, though only for certain partisan groups and for those low in levels of interpersonal trust.     

New politics for a New Germany? Transatlantic perspectives

Parties and Politics in Modern Germany. By GERARD BRAUNTHAL. Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996. Pp.xii + 212, appendix, biblio, index. £44.50 (cloth); £13.50 (paper). ISBN 0–81333–2382–7 and ‐2383–5.

Germany's New Politics. Edited by DAVID P. CONRADT, GERALD R. KLEINFELD, GEORGE K. ROMOSER and CHRISTIAN SOE. Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995. Pp.x + 325, biblio. £25 (cloth); £11.50 (paper). ISBN 1–57181–032–3 and‐033–1.

The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty‐Five. Edited by PETER H. MERKL. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1995. Pp.xiv + 500, index. £47.50. ISBN 0–333–61754–1.     

The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the Second World War

Despite the controversy that will inevitably continue to surround Britain's use of executive detention to contain domestic fascists during the Second World War, recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal the details of MI5's role in the defence regulations. MI5 was one of three bodies responsible for the administration of Defence Regulation 18b (DR18b) and as such its power was limited by an inherent system of checks and balances. As others have suggested, the administration of DR18b was full of tension; however, it is now apparent that this tension was a positive feature of the defence regulations and one that protected the individual rather than condemned him. The strategic detention of key figures from Britain's fascist circles effectively destroyed the ability of fascists to function in unified organizations. Newly available records provide answers to previously unanswerable questions related to the nature of the fascist threat as it was perceived and as it changed throughout the war.     

Shadow boxing in family politics: reply to Martin Durham

In his writings on government foucault commonly uses term ‘political’ as if it were equivalant to a certain understanding of governmental. Thus, in the title of his cotribution to the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ‘Omnes et Singulatim, towards a criticism of ”political reason“, the object of Foucault's usage of the term ‘political’ to refer to a kind of govrmetal reason. Second, I argue that the practice of what Foucault understands by political reason in fact creates coditions for the emergence of a politics and a political reason of a very different kind. The appearance of this latter political reason poses a range of problems which must be addressed by any political (in the sense of governmental) reason but which play little part in Foucault's discussion. It Suggests, in particular, that Foucault's account of the liberal rationality of government is seriously incomplete. Third, I consider the grounds for Foucault's counterposition of political reason to liberation, noting that his critique of political reason as a principle of subjectivation raises a more general issue, which he describes as ‘the politics of ourselves’ (Foucault 1993: 223). I conclude by noting that Foucault's discussions of political reason lead in two very different directions: towards a powerful analysis of the practices and rationalities of government in the modern West or towards a radical critique of most forms of government, including the modern government of oneself.     

Tweaking the Lion's Tail: Edgar J. Tarr,the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,and the British Empire, 1931–1950

In its first 2 decades the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), Canada's premier foreign policy think tank, never functioned merely as a neutral and apolitical research organization. Under the leadership of Edgar Tarr, president of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, and in its capacity as the Canadian Council of the transnational Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), in the 1930s and 1940s the CIIA became an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought to expand Canada's international role, while challenging British imperialism, racism, and Anglo–Saxon dominance. Prominent Canadian diplomats and other officials were complicit in this enterprise, which reached its apogee at the IPR conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942. The CIIA's activities during this period revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms. Throughout World War II, DEA and other Canadian government representatives attended CIIA and IPR conferences as “official non-officials,” effectively cooperating with private individuals in a network of purportedly non-governmental organizations that enabled Canada to exert leverage on the British government, reject British leadership, align itself with the United States, and secure a greater world role. CIIA leaders and Canadian officials also consciously encouraged nationalist forces in India, China, and Southeast Asia that sought to reject colonial rule and Western dominance. CIIA activities thus became part of a web of diplomatic interactions across a transnational network of think tanks within and outside the British Empire that had their own impact upon international affairs.     

Beyond Border Security: Feminist Approaches to Human Trafficking

International human trafficking—sometimes referred to as modern-day slavery—has increasingly come to be seen as a security threat. The question remains as to what kind of threat human trafficking poses. Traditional security approaches to international human trafficking call for analysis of trafficking as a threat to the state and to state control of borders. Traditional security analyses of trafficking therefore emphasize border security, migration controls, and international law enforcement cooperation. Feminist analyses of human trafficking challenge the traditional security framework, prioritizing the security of trafficked persons and recognizing the manner in which victims are threatened by both traffickers and the state itself. I argue that feminist approaches to human trafficking are essential for understanding and combating the phenomenon. Feminists identify the ethical and pragmatic grounds for broadening the analytical focus from states to people. Feminists' most important contribution, however, lies in the investigations of the social construction of human trafficking, which highlight the destructive role that sexist and racist stereotypes play in constructing the category of trafficking victims.     

Apologies in International Politics

This article examines the growing conventional wisdom that apologies and other acts of contrition are necessary for international reconciliation. I create and test a theory that connects a country's remembrance with that country's image—threatening or benign—in the eyes of former adversaries. I evaluate the theory in two post-World War II case studies: South Korean relations with Japan and French relations with Germany.

This article offers three major findings. First, it substantiates the claim that denials inhibit reconciliation. Japanese denials and history textbook omissions have elevated distrust and fear among Koreans (as well as Chinese and Australians). Second, although whitewashing and denials are indeed pernicious, the conventional wisdom about the healing power of contrition must be seriously reconsidered. Evidence from the Japanese and other cases suggests that contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries. Finally, there is good news for the prospects of international reconciliation: countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all. West Germany actually offered very little contrition at the time of its dramatic reconciliation with France; many other countries have restored close and productive relations without contrition. The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash.