Institutional interplay and effectiveness: assessing efforts to conserve western hemisphere shorebirds

Bird conservation agencies and organizations can take credit for a long list of transnational policy accomplishments. This article examines one set, a constellation of arrangements developed over the past three decades by those seeking to conserve western hemisphere shorebirds. At the center of this constellation are the US and Canadian national shorebird conservation plans and a cross-border initiative, the Western Hemisphere Shorebird Conservation Reserve Network. We treat these and associated plans, programs, and initiatives as a nested set of institutions, noting that these are operated by a wide assortment of state and societal actors. Exploring the potential of a framework based on Oran Young’s concept of interplay, we analyze the construction of these institutions and efforts to establish effectiveness. Examining activity in three zones of issue proximity, we conclude that shorebird conservationists have responded well to formative interplay challenges. They have made least progress in engaging remote institutions responsible for threats to shorebird habitat. We note, though, that it is important to distinguish between scientific and political levels of interplay work. On a substantive level we conclude that the shorebird community is well-positioned to move beyond generative and programmatic tasks to focus on establishing policy capability. On a theoretical level, we conclude that a framework based on interplay provides a strong foundation for analysis of the forces shaping the effectiveness of informal conservation institutions such as the ones examined.

How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Postconflict Liberia

Political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's developing democracies are often considered to lack sufficiently sophisticated machines to monitor and incentivize their political brokers. We challenge this view by arguing that the decentralized pyramidal structure of their machines allows them to engage in broker monitoring and incentivizing to mobilize voters, which ultimately improves their electoral performance. This capacity is concentrated (a) among incumbent parties with greater access to resources and (b) where the scope for turnout buying is higher due to the higher costs of voting. Using postwar Liberia to test our argument, we combine rich administrative data with exogenous variation in parties' ability to monitor their brokers. We show that brokers mobilize voters en masse to signal effort, that increased monitoring ability improves the incumbent party's electoral performance, and that this is particularly so in precincts in which voters must travel farther to vote and thus turnout buying opportunities are greater.