Public attitudes towards the death penalty

Responses to a general question regarding the use of the death penalty were compared with the sentences that respondents chose in a set of scenarios describing homicide cases. The percentage of respondents who assigned the death sentence in one or more of the following scenarios was higher than those who favored the death penalty in the abstract question, but there were inconsistencies in the answers. A majority assigned the death penalty only for the most heinous offender described, and the figures were lower for other crimes, even clear cases of first degree murder. At the same time, a manipulation involving information about methods of execution did not affect answers. These results strongly suggest that the abstract questions typically used in public opinion polls do not accurately reflect the public's feelings about use of the death penalty in specific cases. More generally, research on public opinion regarding criminal justice policies should survey a variety of specific circumstances.     

Making the innocent pay

Even those of us who enter the legal profession for reasonsof personal advancement or greed can spot an injustice whenwe see it. As students and raw recruits to the profession, weshare with our clients the notion that, in any cause, one sideis ‘right’ and the other ‘wrong’. Toallow the party in the wrong to vanquish the party in the rightwould be unjust, notwithstanding the fact that the law permitsit. In time our perspective mellows: we learn to appreciatethat     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

Speed/pure war/power crime: Paul Virilio on the criminogenic accident and the virtual disappearance of the suicidal state

This essay applies the theoretical concepts of pure war and speed-politics developed by the critical theorist and urbanist Paul Virilio to the concept of power crime. The aim of this paper is to present readers unfamiliar with Virilio’s work with a philosophical methodology of great potential significance to critical criminology. It is divided into two major parts. The first part re-considers power crime and the broader criminogenic environment in terms of the Virilian notions of velocity, optics, and pure war: criminogenic phenomena are shown to be the necessary and unavoidable by-products of the wider convergences among political, economic, and military systems governed by speed. The second part consists of an empirical case study illustrating the practical applicability of these abstract Virilian concepts: the federal prosecution of the private security firm Custer Battles for fraud. The systemic corruption of the US military procurement process and the inability of the federal judicial system to provide a remedy for the fraud perpetrated against the American public is read as a key sign of the suspension of the liberal juro-political order and the effective abolition of the rule of law by fast moving, or “high velocity”, criminogenic processes.