Catastrophe and the Public Service: A Case Study of the Government Response to the Destruction of the World Trade Center

The destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, resulted in a rapid response by government to evacuate the area and, in subsequent days, to bring the city back to a semblance of normalcy. This article provides a case study of government action in New York City during and after the World Trade Center catastrophe. What is most striking is the skill and intensity of government's response to the emergency and the hard work, dedication, and bravery of New York City's government officials. This article presents government and public service at its finest, under some of the most difficult conditions one can imagine.     

Output–Purchase Funding and Budgeting Systems in the Public Sector

Output–purchase funding systems are systems in which payments made to service delivery agencies by government are an explicit function of quantities of outputs delivered by those agencies. This article considers the feasibility of such systems for the funding of tax–financed public services. It focuses on the implications of key characteristics of public sector outputs and specifically upon the prevalence of heterogeneous outputs, the predominance of services (as opposed to physical goods), and the presence of many "contingent capacity services."     

Incentives Increase the Rate of False but not True Secondary Confessions from Informants with an Allegiance to a Suspect

One hundred ninety-two students participated in an experimental simulation testing whether incentives would reduce the reluctance of informants to implicate a close other. Half of the students were made to feel interpersonally close to a confederate who either admitted to or denied a misdeed. All students were interrogated and encouraged to sign a secondary confession stating that the confederate had confessed to the misdeed; half were offered an incentive to do so. Contrary to expectations, closeness did not induce reluctance. Instead, the offer of incentive increased the number of participants willing to sign a secondary confession implicating a close other. Further analyses revealed that this increase occurred only for false secondary confessions. Implications for interrogation practices are discussed.     

Bureaucratic Inefficiency: Failure to Capture the Efficiencies of Outsourcing

This paper analyzes the political economy ofoutsourcing by 16 federal bureaus during 1981-96. Inan era of restricted budgets and budget balancing, thepaper questions why federal bureaus did not exploitfully the efficiencies of outsourcing. It proves thatfederal bureaus can achieve technical and costefficiency through outsourcing when contracts can benearly fully specified. Federal bureaus outsource byobtaining inputs to their production processes throughcontracts with competitive market producing units. Econometric results substantiate the hypothesis that``institutions matter,'' and reveal that bureausachieve varying levels of technical efficiency throughdifferent levels of outsourcing.