Wrongful convictions and claims of false or misleading forensic evidence

The results are reported of a study to examine case factors associated with 732 wrongful convictions classified by the National Registry of Exonerations as being associated with “False or Misleading Forensic Evidence.” A forensic error typology has been developed to provide a structure for the categorization and coding of factors relating to misstatements in forensic science reports; errors of individualization or classification; testimony errors; issues relating to trials and officers of the court; and evidence handling and reporting issues. This study, which included the analysis of 1391 forensic examinations, demonstrates that most errors related to forensic evidence are not identification or classification errors by forensic scientists. When such errors are made, they are frequently associated with incompetent or fraudulent examiners, disciplines with an inadequate scientific foundation, or organizational deficiencies in training, management, governance, or resources. More often, forensic reports or testimony miscommunicate results, do not conform to established standards, or fail to provide appropriate limiting information. Just as importantly, actors within the broader criminal justice system—but not under the purview of any forensic science organization—may contribute to errors that may be related to the forensic evidence. System issues include reliance on presumptive tests without confirmation by a forensic laboratory, use of independent experts outside the administrative control of public laboratories, inadequate defense, and suppression or misrepresentation of forensic evidence by investigators or prosecutors. In approximately half of wrongful convictions analyzed, improved technology, testimony standards, or practice standards may have prevented a wrongful conviction at the time of trial.     

Arts and Cultural Engagement,Reportedly Antisocial or Criminalized Behaviors,and Potential Mediators in Two Longitudinal Cohorts of Adolescents

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Arts and cultural engagement is a potential strategy for reducing or preventing reportedly antisocial or criminalized behaviors (those previously and...     

Managing Politics? Ethics Regulation and Conflicting Conceptions of “Good Conduct”

Concern for fostering trust in public institutions has prompted many governments to invest in systems of ethics regulation, embracing various dimensions of good governance. This article assesses the impact of ethics regulation on the conduct of English local politicians using Foucauldian perspectives on government, power, and resistance. The research finds that ethics regulation encountered problems when politicians resisted the models of political identity and behavior that it was perceived to promote. Particular concentrations of misconduct complaints were identified in which politicians believed that changes to political management structures, designed to make local governance more effective, caused a loss of voice for elected representatives. Ethics regulation itself sometimes served as a device for controlling others and effecting resistance. The article concludes with reflections on how far we should expect political conduct to be managed by such regulatory practices.     

How the ‘entry’ defines the ‘exit’: contradictions between the political and military strategies adopted in 2001 and how they have deleteriously affected the longer-term possibilities for stabilisation in Afghanistan

Focusing on the period 2001–2003, the paper discusses how the Western military intervention in Afghanistan changed power structures early on, undermining the political settlement in the long term and culminating in the present electoral crisis. Key concepts, a theoretical framework and the initial military approach (including how the initial military strategy undermined an indigenous solution for toppling the Taliban) are outlined and literature focused on hybrid governance and ‘legitimacy’ as an important but overlooked facet of peace-building is presented. Examples of ‘lessons learned’ in relation to the failure to engage with traditional forms of governance–early on in the Afghan conflict—are set out. The objective is to show that the military strategy adopted in 2001–2002 had adverse long-term consequences that were hard to reverse later on (e.g. by shifting the goalposts of military activity to, for example, a counter-insurgency strategy from 2005 onwards). This paper does not aim to resolve these paradoxes in the Afghan context going forward but offers implicit recommendations based on ‘lessons learned’.