Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations.     

Regulatory Failure and the Collapse of Japan's Home Mortgage Lending Industry: A Legal and Economic Analysis

This article analyzes the dynamics of contemporary cooperation and conflict in Japanese financial regulation through the prism of the jusen problem, the collapse of Japan's home mortgage lending industry in the 1990s. The jusen problem is one of the most striking examples of regulatory failure, strategic interest group bargaining, and large-scale dispute resolution in Japanese history.     

More Sinned Against than Sinning? The Case of the Arab Office, Washington, 1945-1948

In 1945, as a final settlement of the Palestine question drew near, the Arab states established the Arab Office, Washington, as part of their unprecedented effort to influence public and elite opinion on this matter in the United States. It was staffed by many of the leading young Arab intellectuals of the era. This article charts the Arab Office's attempt to reduce American support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In particular, it examines the accusations, made at the time, that the Arab Office, in pursuing its anti-Zionist agenda had co-operated with leading American anti-Semites and was under the control of the notorious former Mufti of Jerusalem, who had collaborated with Hitler during the Second World War.     

Norms,Behavioral Compliance,and Status Attribution in International Politics

Extant work on status attribution has largely focused on major powers or state capabilities as key explanatory factors driving these social processes and suggests that status considerations increase conflicts between states. We argue for a more comprehensive approach to status attribution that considers international norms as another major factor that is weighed in the attribution process. We contend that states (policymakers) evaluate one another not only on the basis of economic and military capabilities but also on the extent to which there is behavioral conformance with normative expectations and reward one another dependent upon whether these expectations are met. However, this attribution of status is dependent upon the level of contestation pertaining to that norm. Using a data set that assesses consistency with six different norms (resource transference, multilateralism, economic liberalism, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and peaceful dispute resolution), we find that status attribution is associated with norm-consistent behavior but only when these norms are uncontested at the global level.     

Alternative Methods of Experience Rating Unemployment Insurance Employer Taxes

For most states the methodology used for assigning Unemployment Insurance tax rates to employers arose when the program was first established in 1935. More than 80 years later, with evolving employment relationships, state systems have become outmoded. This paper critiques current experience rating methods and presents new methodologies that are much easier to operate and that improve the incentives for employers to increase employment. The proposed methods would assess taxes based on employment or payroll variation such that growing firms would have lower taxes. A simulation analysis illustrates the impact of the new methods on employer groups.