Group Size, Group Heterogeneity, and Voting Rules: An Application of the Buchanan-Tullock Model to the European Union

In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock develop a theory of voting rules in which the optimal rule is determined by minimizing the sum of voters' external and decision costs. Other researchers have extended the Buchanan-Tullock model to include the effects of group size and heterogeneity on external and decision costs and, subsequently, on the optimal voting rule. Despite the prominence of the Buchanan-Tullock model in the constitutional, legal, and public-choice literature, their theory has not (to our knowledge) been tested. In this paper we test the Buchanan-Tullock model by examining the establishment and evolution of voting rules in the European Union. Over the past four decades, the European Union has experienced significant changes in number and heterogeneity, and we interpret the general movement towards, and call for, less inclusive voting rules as support for Buchanan and Tullock's original theory.     

Family Drug Court,Targeted Parent Training and Family Reunification: Did this Enhanced Service Strategy Make A Difference?

This article reports findings from an evaluation of reunification outcomes for children and families who participated in a family drug court (FDC) that incorporated the use of two innovative evidence‐based parenting programs. In addition to comprehensive FDC services, families participated in the Strengthening Families Program and Celebrating Families!^TM programs in a sequential format. Data analyses were conducted on a sample of 214 children whose child welfare cases were adjudicated through the FDC and 418 matched comparison cases. Entry‐cohort survival analysis results indicated that families receiving FDC services were more than twice as likely to reunify in a 45 month observation window.     

The Gendered Face of Partisan Politics: Consequences of Facial Sex Typicality for Vote Choice

Facial cues are consequential for voters’ behavior at the polls. Yet the facial cues that are associated with vote choice remain under-examined. We predicted that vote choice judgments rely, in part, on the sex typicality of facial cues (i.e., the degree of facial masculinity and femininity) that vary as a function of candidate gender and partisan identification. Stimuli included image pairs of winners and runners-up in the elections for the 111th U.S. House of Representatives. In Study 1, we found that female Republican candidates who appeared relatively more feminine and male Republican candidates who looked relatively less masculine in their appearance were more likely to win their election. Democratic candidates’ electoral success was not related to their sex typicality. In Study 2, we found that relatively masculine-appearing Democrats and feminine-appearing Republicans were more likely to be selected in a hypothetical vote choice task. Implications for U.S. partisan politics are discussed.     

Family and Peer Relationships in a Residential Youth Sample: Exploring Unique,Non-Linear,and Interactive Associations with Depressive Symptoms and Suicide Risk

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Close relationships are consequential for youth depressive symptoms and suicide risk, but nuanced research examining intersecting factors is needed to improve...     

The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979

This analysis re-examines the Carter Administration’s formulation of policy on the theatre nuclear force issue following the neutron bomb affair. It demonstrates that European leaders did not foist the arms control component of the NATO dual-track decision on Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Carter Administration understood the merits of an arms control component following the August 1978 PRM-38 review and thought that Soviet–American arms control negotiations would play a crucial role in resolving the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over theatre nuclear forces. This analysis also considers the previously unexamined interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the months leading to the dual-track decision. It reveals that American officials underestimated the degree of Soviet anger over the dual-track decision, believing that arms control negotiations with the Soviets on theatre nuclear forces would be possible and productive. The Carter Administration did not foresee the Euromissiles crisis.