Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems

Why do some individuals prefer to be governed in an authoritarian political system? One intuitive answer is that citizens prefer authoritarian rule when the economy and society are in turmoil. These are common explanations for democratic backsliding, and the emergence and success of authoritarian leaders in the twentieth century. Which of these explanations better explains preferences for authoritarian rule? Both types of threat coincide in small samples and high-profile cases, creating inferential problems. I address this by using three waves of World Values Survey data to look at individual-level preferences for different forms of authoritarian government. Using multiple macroeconomic and societal indicators, I find that economic threats, especially increasing income inequality, better explain preferences for authoritarian government. I conclude with implications for understanding the emergence of support for authoritarianism in fledgling democracies.     

Routine activity and labor market segmentation An empirical test of a revised approach

This article contends that routine activity theory has virtually ignored the motivated offender construct in terms of its measurement. We extend previous research testing routine activity theory by more accurately modeling the effects of labor market segmentation and other structural sources of offender motivation on variation in crime rates. A revised routine activity model is tested using data for the 100 largest cities in the US in 1980. The findings suggest that as secondary labor markets grow, urban crime can be expected to rise.