Opaque transparency: How material affordances shape intermediary work

How do the material aspects of intermediary work affect regulators, targets, and beneficiaries? To shed light on this question, we studied an information intermediary in the form of a website and the organizations who founded it. Specifically, we analyzed FracFocus, a self‐regulatory initiative with strong industry ties, charged with disclosing data pertaining to the chemicals used in oil and gas wells completed using hydraulic fracturing technology (fracking) in the United States and Canada. We found that between 2010 and mid‐2017, the vast majority of legislation in states and provinces where fracking actively occurred was updated to mandate or encourage disclosure via FracFocus, meaning that it had a considerable effect on the trajectory of official regulation on fracking disclosure. We also found that FracFocus disclosed important data but did so in a manner that limited accessibility and reduced the comprehensibility of environmental and public health risks to beneficiaries. Our analysis suggests that the public's experience of such a device is one of opaque transparency, in which the line between official and non‐official regulation is blurred. We traced these outcomes to the material affordances created by FracFocus.     

Between regulatory field structuring and organizational roles: Intermediation in the field of sustainable urban development

Recent contributions in the domains of governance and regulation elucidate the importance of rule‐intermediation (RI), the role that organizations adopt to bridge actors with regulatory or “rulemaking” roles and those with target or “rule‐taking” roles. Intermediation not only enables the diffusion and translation of regulatory norms, but also allows for the representation of different actors in policymaking arenas. While prior studies have explored the roles that such RIs adopt to facilitate their intermediation functions, we have yet to consider how field‐level structuring processes influence (and are influenced by) the various and changing roles adopted by RI. In this study we focus on the mutually constitutive relations between field‐level change processes and the evolving roles of RIs by studying the rise of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)/Local Governments for Sustainability, an RI serving as a bridge for sustainable urban development policies between the United Nations and local authorities. Using ICLEI as an illustrative case, we theorize four different processes of regulatory field structuration: problematization, role specialization, marketization, and orchestrated decentralization. We discuss their implications for RI roles in the field and further theorize the changing dynamics of trickle‐up intermediation processes as an RI gains power and influence.     

Presidential mandates and ministerial institutions: Summitry of the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

The periodic Summits of the Americas are the highest form of regional multilateralism in the Western Hemisphere, but summits lack their own means to implement their mandates. Hence, Summit Plans of Action assign many initiatives to existing regional institutions, especially the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). But a notable difference exists in the character and degree to which these two institutions have responded to their unfunded mandates, in that the OAS has become “nested” under the hierarchy of summitry, while the IDB has eschewed subordination in favor of a “parallel” relationship pursuing largely convergent activities. Relying on extensive interviews and reviews of open source and internal documents, six variables are found to explain this differential response: ministerial authorities, competing mandates, institutional missions, internal structures, membership and leadership. Yet for both regional institutions there remains a wide gap between the directives emanating from the Summits and what the two regional institutions have been—and could be—accomplishing. The study concludes with recommendations to improve institutional design. JEL codes L31 · F42 · F02 · D73 · F1     

Complex scientific testimony: How do jurors make decisions?

Critics of the civil jury system question whether jurors can adequately evaluate complex expert testimony. Based on current models of research in persuasion, we hypothesized that when expert testimony is complex, factors other than content will influence persuasion. Participants, serving as mock jurors, watched a videotaped trial in which two scientists provided evidence on whether PCBs could have caused a plaintiff's illness. The complexity of the expert's testimony and the strength of the expert's credentials were varied in a 2×2 factorial design. After watching the videotape, mock jurors rendered a verdict and completed a number of attitude measures related to the trial. Overall, consistent with our prediction, we found that jurors were more persuaded by a highly expert witness than by a less expert witness, but only when the testimony was highly complex. When the testimony was less complex, jurors relied primarily on the content of that testimony, and witness credentials had little impact on the persuasiveness of the message.     

The World Trading System, the International Legal System and Multilevel Choice

Abstract:  This article develops a theory of multilevel choice of regulatory jurisdiction based on normative individualism, and suggests how certain features of the World Trade Organization (WTO) might be understood in terms of this theory. The WTO has some capacity for positive integration, as demonstrated in, for example, the harmonised minimum standards for intellectual property protection contained in the TRIPS agreement. Yet the WTO has generally not been used as a site for re-regulation in areas congruent with its de-regulation. However, in a limited way, and in particular contexts, it provides certain incentives for re-regulation at other sites. For example, both the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement encourage the formation of harmonised rules. These agreements require Member States to use international standards as a basis for their measures, with important exceptions.