The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems

Cabinet coalitions are central to the functioning of Latin American presidential systems. However, the reasons for their formation remain unclear. While recent studies suggest that presidents invite parties to the cabinet to facilitate governability and lawmaking, this study argues that the composition of cabinet coalitions is largely predetermined by commitments made before presidential elections. To analyze this argument, the study introduces the conditional logit model as a new empirical strategy for modeling cabinet choice under this type of regime. Based on a new dataset of 107 cabinets in 13 Latin American democracies, the study shows that pre‐electoral commitments strongly affect cabinet formation and thereby also confound the relationship between cabinet formation and governability.     

Why brands should foster political sustainability

Sustainability figures prominently in the rhetoric around the nonfinancial responsibilities of business, as is manifest in the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Often, however, sustainability assumes a narrow social and ecological meaning. A more comprehensive and apt concept would instead focus on the political dimension of sustainability. The long-term success of business depends primarily on sound institutions as embodied in the liberal democratic state. Therefore, companies should invest politically in strengthening the public realm—to their own benefit. CSR misses this strategic nexus; rather, the business case lies in the adoption of a corporate political responsibility (CPR). Advocating for a broad definition of what is political, the paper lays out concrete CPR fields of action that allow companies to become political brands. As a holistic concept to conceive of the interface between business and politics, CPR does not only help to secure a company's longevity, but also reorients our understanding and practice of public affairs.     

Hans Georg Ruppe – 65 Jahre

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules

To solve their domestic and international problems, democratizing states often form new international organizations. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design: what types of rules and provisions should be included in the charter of the new international organization? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules, with an emphasis on voting rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Organizations with strict accession rules allow the founding members to regulate entry. This is particularly useful for transitional democracies, as democratizing states are initially unable to gain entry into the lucrative existing international organizations operated by the established democracies. Using original data on accession voting rules in 324 international organizations, we find strong evidence in support of our claims.     

Veralten faunistische Daten und Bewertungen nach 5 Jahren – und sind sie bis dahin aktuell genug?

Natur und Recht - Im Rahmen der Diskussion um Standards zur Erhebung und Anwendung faunistischer Daten für Planungs- und Zulassungsverfahren spielt auch die Frage der Aktualität eine...