FORENSIC ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON PRICE FIXING

This paper aims at explaining accepted methods of forensic analysisand how forensic economics is used in the context of competition-lawenforcement. Illustrations are drawn from ancient and modernantitrust cases involving price-fixing allegations. The statedgoal of antitrust laws of most nations is deterrence. Optimaldeterrence requires that cartel penalties be based on multiplesof economic injuries. Yet, antitrust authorities are typicallyreluctant to calculate fines on the basis of damages becauseof perceived analytical challenges or because the fact-finderslack needed economic education. However, reasonable estimatesof damages can often be quickly prepared using simpler methodsthan econometric modeling. More often than not, alternativeestimates of cartel overcharges tend to be mutually supportive.The reluctance of antitrust authorities to base fines on damagesseems to indicate an abundance of caution.     

Optimism as a Mediator Between the Experience of Child Abuse,Other Traumatic Events,and Distress

In this study, we examined the role of dispositional optimism in mediating distress among students who experienced traumatic events, including child physical abuse, emotional abuse, and sexual abuse. Participants included 199 undergraduate and graduate students (aged 18–63 years) from a private university in Oregon. In this study, dispositional optimism partially mediated distress among individuals who had experienced child physical abuse and child emotional abuse; participants with higher levels of optimism had lower levels of distress. In addition, dispositional optimism fully mediated distress among individuals who had experienced traumatic events such as rape, assault, and fire; participants with higher levels of optimism had lower levels of distress. Contrary to prediction, the experience of child sexual abuse was not associated with distress. Clinical implications of these results are addressed.     

Decolonising Europe? The Colonial Boomerang

The hidden secret at the core of Michael Haneke's remarkable film of that name is Georges Laurent's denunciation of a young Algerian boy who found refuge on his relatives’ farm after his own parents had perished in the infamous 1961 Paris massacre. In a bizarre return of the repressed, the memory of this betrayal invades and destroys his affluent bourgeois existence forty years later. In this article, I attempt to link this return to the “colonial boomerang” of the suburban revolts of 2005 (and 2007) and the “official” occlusion of past crimes against humanity most clearly shown in the case of Maurice Papon, in which the betrayal of France's Jews and the massacre of Algerian demonstrators merge on the grounds of the Veld'Hiv.     

When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances?

Recent research suggests a conditional relationship between states' domestic regimes or ideologies and their alliances. I argue that the likelihood that alliances will form along ideological lines increases with the fear among at least two governments of ideology I that they are threatened by transnational rival ideology J . Understanding the power of demonstration effects—that when J advances in one country it gains credibility in others— I -governments will have an incentive to enter an international agreement to oppose J domestically. Such domestic-security agreements will exacerbate the security dilemma, raising fears among J -governments that I -governments are forming a bloc directed at J and J -governments. J -governments will tend to respond by increasing cooperation among themselves, inducing corresponding fears among I -governments; the coalescing I - and J -blocs will tend to spiral into alliances. I - or J -governments wishing to avoid ideologically based alliances may signal an absence of rollback intentions through various means. I demonstrate this process of alliance formation with a lengthy case study of alliance formation in the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century.     

Further notes on information,corruption, and optimal law enforcement

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). We are grateful to Mitch Polinsky and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Supreme Court Ruling Creates More Standing Room in the Already Heated Global Greenhouse Gas Movement

This article reviews the recent April 2, 2007 Supreme Court decision in the Massachusetts v. EPA, a highly important case regarding greenhouse gases. The case centered on the Court's review of EPA's denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The Court required EPA to reconsider its denial. The Court found that. 1) the petitioners have standing to challenge EPA's denial of their petition; 2) the Court has the authority to review the denial of the petition; and 3) the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. This article looks specifically at the Court's analysis of standing and jurisdiction by Justice Stevens, who wrote the Court's majority opinion, and two dissenting opinions by Justices Roberts and Scalia. Most interesting is how the closely divided Justices (5 to 4 decision) viewed, very differently, the issues regarding standing, the evidence that emissions from new motor vehicles are causing global warming and harm to Massachusetts, and the agency's judgment in denying the petition. Lastly, the article speculates on the impact of the decision and the current activities taking place at the state and regulated community level involving future regulation, litigation, and opportunities by various companies and coalitions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The article then presents five broad areas where companies that emit greenhouse gases should need to maintain or increase awareness to better position themselves in the global greenhouse gas movement.     

To a hammer, everything looks like a nail

Legal context: Trade mark oppositions are routinely filed by brand owners againstan offending application or registration in either a pre-grantor a post-grant procedure before the respective national trademark office, but in Japan, there are several nuanced trade markopposition practice differences that should not be taken forgranted. Key issues: In light of persisting and recent abysmal trade mark opponentsuccess rates, favourable trade mark invalidation appeal (IA)data, and the inherent procedural handicaps against opponentsin Japan's current trade mark opposition system, Trade markowners would be better served by using Japan's trade mark IAprocedures to police against conflicting trade marks in Japanand not mechanistically file oppositions in Japan as one couldin other important trade mark jurisdictions like the USA orEurope. Practical significance: Japan's trade mark opposition and IA procedures offer complementaryoptions to police against conflicting trade marks so choosingthe right procedure is critical to its achieving the mission'ssuccess in curbing competitors' marks in the world's secondlargest free market economy.