An Experimental Template for Case Study Research

Methods are usually classified as either "experimental" or "observational," a dichotomy that has governed social science research for centuries. By implication, this dichotomization precludes a consideration of experimental strategies in case study work. Yet, we argue that one gains purchase on the tasks of research design by integrating the criteria traditionally applied to experimental work to all research in the social sciences—including case study work, the focus of this article. Experimental research designs aim to achieve variation through time and across space while maintaining ceteris paribus assumptions, thus maximizing leverage into the fundamental problem of causal inference. We propose to capture these multiple criteria in a four-fold typology: (1) A Dynamic comparison mirrors laboratory experimentation through the use of both temporal and spatial variation; (2) A Longitudinal comparison employs temporal variation; (3) A Spatial comparison exploits variation through space; and (4) A Counterfactual comparison relies on imagined comparison. All comparison case study research designs can be slotted into one of these four categories. Moreover, the typology illustrates in a concise fashion the ways in which case study research designs attempt to mimic the virtues of experimental design and the degree to which they succeed. The classic experiment, with manipulated treatment and randomized control, thus provides a useful template for discussion about methodological issues in experimental and observational contexts.     

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise

We investigate how aspects of "civil service" systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship-specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy-motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis-à-vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; "neutral competence" is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-motivated bureaucrats.     

The Wisdom of Crowds: Learning from Administrators' Predictions of Citizen Perceptions

Public agencies use surveys to solicit feedback from citizens and targeted customer groups, but many experts question whether the results of these surveys are valuable. This paper explores how a recent innovation in citizen surveys—asking public administrators to predict how citizens will respond to survey questions—may be used to increase that value and, at the same time, provide additional data of interest on its own account. The innovation is explored through two surveys: (1) a public opinion poll of Georgia residents conducted by the authors for the Georgia Department of Transportation in January 2004, and (2) a brief survey of that agency's administrators asking for their predictions of public opinion. The prediction process appeared to increase the agency's interest in the resident survey. The findings document the frequent superiority of groups—what Surowiecki terms "the wisdom of crowds"—over individuals in predicting public opinion.     

Putting the Resource-Based View of Strategy and Distinctive Competencies to Work in Public Organizations

A key to the success of public organizations is their ability to identify and build capacity, particularly their distinctive competencies, in order to produce the greatest value for key stakeholders. This article grounds this proposition in the resource-based view of organizations and presents a method for identifying and making use of distinctive competencies in the form of a "livelihood scheme"—a business model appropriate for the public sector—that links distinctive competencies to organizational aspirations and goals. The case of a major public sector training and consultancy unit that is part of the United Kingdom's National Health Service is used as illustration. A number of conclusions are offered in the form of a set of propositions tied to the resource-based view and related research issues. The results contribute to both public strategic management theory and practice.     

Parent-adolescent congruence for adolescent substance use

Parental reports of adolescent substance use were compared to the adolescents' self-reports using identical scales. Congruence was defined as exact agreement on whether adolescents were current users, ex-users, or never-users. Both parents were found to be less accurate in predicting their adolescents' alcohol use compared to cigarette or marijuana use. Single mothers were significantly less likely to be congruent than were mothers from two-parent households. Mother and father congruence on all substances was unrelated to the adolescent's sex, race, or after school employment. For both parents, congruence for adolescent marijuana use was significantly related to the age and GPA of the adolescent. Congruence may also reflect important properties of family functioning, as significant relations were found between both adolescent and parent ratings of family cohesion and parent-adolescent congruence on perceptions of marijuana use.This research was supported by Grant DA03706 from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (Hyman Hops, Principal Investigator).Jennifer Langhinrichsen is a doctoral candidate in psychology interested in adolescent and family interactions. The other authors are psychologists or data analysts working on family influences on substance use and mental health.     

Who Said Production Was Simple?: Delineating the ‘Public Production Process’

This is a response to Robert Gregory's discussion of the author's article 'Towards a New Public Management Model', AJPA 52(2). It argues that Gregory has misunderstood the rationale of the author's 'public production process' model. He misrepresents the model as simplistic and as understating the complexities of politics in public administration. As a result, the potential promise of Gregory's alternative conception is inadequately realised.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

The 1992, 1994 and 1996 elections: A comment and a forecast

A model of the two-way relationship between elections and the economy, previously estimated on historical data for 1916–1988, is applied to the United States elections of 1992, 1994, and 1996. The 1992 result was a surprise to the model since the economy had performed reasonably well that election year. The midterm elections of 1994 were accurately forecast. The Republicans took control of Congress not because of unusual circumstances but because of a normal midterm cycle. President Clinton's chances in 1996 look dim given the current modest growth rate and an electoral bias favoring Republican presidential candidates. But an alternative model, keyed more to the voters choosing Clinton to balance the Republican Congress, gives him a reasonable chance of reelection.