Characterization of an odor permeable membrane device for the storage of explosives and use as canine training aids

The storage and use of explosives is regulated at the state and federal level, with a particular focus on physical security and rigorous accounting of the explosive inventory. For those working with explosives for the training and testing of explosive-detecting canines, cross-contamination is an important concern. Hence, explosives intended for use with canine teams must be placed into secondary storage containers that are new, clean, and airtight. A variety of containers meet these requirements and include screw-top glass jars (e.g., mason jars). However, an additional need from the explosive-detecting canine community is secondary containers that can also be used as training aids whereby the volatiles emitted by explosives are emitted in a predictable and stable manner. Currently, a generally accepted method for the storage of explosives and controlled emission of explosive vapor for canine detection does not exist. Ideally, such containers should allow odor to escape from the training aid but block external contaminates such as particulates or other volatiles. One method in use places the explosive inside a permeable cotton bag when in use for training and then stores the cotton bag inside an impermeable nylon bag for long-term storage. This paper describes the testing of an odor permeable membrane device (OPMD) as a new way to store and deploy training aids. We measured the evaporation rate and flux of various liquid explosives and volatile compounds that have been identified in the headspace of actual explosives. OPMDs were used in addition to traditional storage containers to monitor the contamination and degradation of 14 explosives used as canine training aids. Explosives were stored individually using traditional storage bags or inside an OPMD at two locations, one of which actively used the training aids. Samples from each storage type at both locations were collected at 0, 3, 6, and 9 months and analyzed using Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectroscopy and Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry (GC–MS) with Solid-Phase Microextraction (SPME). FTIR analyses showed no signs of degradation. GC–MS identified cross-contamination from ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN) and/or 2,3-dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane (DMNB) across almost all samples regardless of storage condition. The contamination was found to be higher among training aids that were stored in traditional ways and that were in active use by canine teams.     

Resistant to Change? The European Commission and Expert Group Reform

This article examines how the European Commission has responded to external criticism and demands for the democratisation and reform of the way it uses expert groups in EU policy making. The article analyses the nature and character of the Commission’s dialogue with its critics and the degree and extent to which it was prepared to adapt its existing internal processes and procedures to the reform agenda. Recent theories inform us that organisations respond in different ways to external criticism and demands for reform, including full adaptation, evasion, institutional decoupling and reinterpretation. The main findings suggest that the Commission was not completely resistant to changing its approach to the use of expertise. The Commission reinterpreted its critics’ demands by introducing reforms that defused this external pressure, while protecting the effectiveness of its existing internal ideology and processes. These findings serve to enhance the Commission’s image as an increasingly normalised bureaucracy and reinforce the importance of knowledge and expertise as a key source of Commission legitimacy.     

Signaling through Obstruction

Obstruction is a time‐honored tradition in legislative politics. In many cases, obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful, and in some of these cases, purely costly even to the obstructor. In this article, I construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient. The theory, based on the legislators' reelection motivations, offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting, including the legislator's value for reelection, the appeal of the legislator's challenger, the legislator's individual‐specific seniority, competence, and/or valence, and the visibility of the legislator's obstruction efforts to the voter. Finally, the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators' individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing, even in the absence of pandering.     

The No‐men of England: The Geordie Revolt that Defeated the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1977

The Scotland and Wales Acts 1978 failed on multiple criteria. Although devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales was a principal policy of the Labour governments in office from 1974 to 1979, it was defeated in a guillotine vote in 1977. That defeat was orchestrated by the leaders of Tyne & Wear County Council, angry that a government of their own party was apparently neglecting their region in favour of Scotland. The project was rescued in two separate bills, but a further rebel amendment inserted a minimum assent condition in the required referendums. The people of Wales rejected the devolution they were offered. The people of Scotland accepted it, but by a margin that failed to cross the threshold. The resulting vote of confidence brought down the Labour government in March 1979. The role of Tyne & Wear County Council in killing the first bill has never been fully acknowledged. The lessons of the story for current devolution policy are explored. If the UK remains a single country, any policy for tax transfers must be fair to the English as well as to the people of the other three territories.     

Citizen Attributions of Blame in Third‐Party Governance

The authors use a survey experiment to examine how structural differences in governance arrangements affect citizens’ notions of who is culpable for poor service quality. More specifically, two questions are investigated: (1) When things go wrong, do citizens attribute more blame to political actors if the provider of government services is a public agency or a private contractor? (2) Does the length of the accountability chain linking political actors to service providers influence citizens’ attributions of blame? The authors hypothesize that provider sector and accountability chain length affect citizens’ perceptions of political actors’ control over service delivery, which, in turn, inform citizens’ attributions of blame. Mixed support is found for this theory.