Managing North Sea Pollution Effectively:Linking International and Domestic Institutions

Most pollution problems arise as by-products of domestic activity. The effectiveness of international environmental regimes thus depends on the operations of domestic political and administrative institutions. However, the study of regime effectiveness tends to overlook the operation of domestic institutions as well as the interests and preferences of sub-national non-state actors. In this article, a framework for combining the study of regime effectiveness with domestic institutions and actors is initially presented. The merits of this framework within the context of the North Sea regime is then explored. The article concludes that the effectiveness of this regime depends on the operation of both international and domestic institutions. Of particular importance are those sub-national actors actually causing the problem in the first place as well as domestic institutions influencing the behaviour of target groups.     

Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance

One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto’s cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on an internationally harmonized carbon tax. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an_. effective enforcement mechanism. However, such a mechanism is unlikely to be adopted as part of a regime with full participation, because the political process leading up to its adoption tends to water down the enforcement mechanism to a point where it no longer has much bite. And even if this is somehow avoided, countries expecting compliance to be difficult or costly will almost certainly decline to sign—not to mention ratify—the resulting agreement. Second, the implications of non-compliance in a tax regime differ in important ways from the corresponding implications in a cap-and-trade regime. In a cap-and-trade regime emissions trading can make inaction legitimate for buyers of emission permits. In particular, overselling of permits by one (or a few) permit exporting countries might completely undermine the regime’s environmental effect. In a tax regime, by contrast, one country’s non-compliance can not make inaction by other countries legitimate. It follows that an agreement based on a harmonized carbon tax will always have some effect, provided that at least one country complies.     

Elementary Grade Retention in Texas and Reading Achievement Among Racial Groups: 1994–2002

Students who failed the Texas mandatory third grade reading test were followed through their sophomore year in high school. Comparisons of reading scores between third grade students who repeated the grade and their socially promoted classmates revealed that the positive effect of retention persisted over time. Retention in third grade benefited low‐performing readers regardless of race. Supplemental analyses found that the results are not likely attributable to selection biases, differential attrition of students from the panel, changes in the special education status of students, and regression to the mean effects. Making students repeat a grade, when supplemented with additional educational assistance, can benefit academically challenged children.     

Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway

In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the forces of esteem, there is “too little” norm compliance. In this paper, we show that Cowen’s logic is flawed – that when the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem incentives for public goods contributions generate optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.     

Grundzüge kausaler Analyse in Tocquevilles <Emphasis Type="Italic">Über die Demokratie in Amerika</Emphasis>

Zusammenfassung Alexis de Tocqueville schrieb über die Demokratie in Amerika, um seine franz?sischen Landsleute davon zu überzeugen, dass ihre ?ngste vor einer Demokratie nach amerikanischer Art unbegründet seien. Zu diesem Zweck nutzte Tocqueville sowohl Modelle aus der politischen Psychologie wie solche sozialer Kausalit?t. Letzteren widmet sich der folgende Beitrag, und es sind diese Modelle kausaler Mechanismen, die über die Demokratie in Amerika auch heute noch lesenswert machen.

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Summary Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America was written to persuade his French compatriots that their fears of Americanstyle democracy were ungrounded. In pursuing this end, Tocqueville used a number of models of political psychology and social causality. His marshalling of models of causal mechanisms to persuade his readers is analyzed, the claim being that such an analysis is the primary reason for reading Democracy in America today.

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Résumé Alexis de Tocqueville a écrit De la démocratie en Amérique pour convaincre ses compatriotes fran?ais que leurs craintes à l’égard d’une démocratie d’inspiration américaine étaient infondées. A cette fin, Tocqueville a eu recours aussi bien à des modèles issus de la psychologie politique qu’à des modèles de causalité sociale. Le présent article se penche sur ces derniers. Ce sont en effet ces modèles d’explication des mécanismes causaux qui font aujourd’hui encore l’intérêt de De la démocratie en Amérique.

     

Regulation of Firearm Dealers in the United States: An Analysis of State Law and Opportunities for Improvement

Firearms were associated with 30, 136 deaths in the United States in 2003. Most guns are initially sold to the public through a network of retail dealers. Licensed firearm dealers are an important source of guns for criminals and gun traffickers. Just one percent of licensed dealers were responsible for more than half of all guns traced to crime. Federal law makes it difficult for ATF to inspect and revoke the licenses of problem gun dealers. State licensing systems, however, are a greatly under-explored opportunity for firearm dealer oversight. We identify and categorize these state systems to identify opportunities for interventions to prevent problem dealers from supplying guns to criminals, juveniles, or gun traffickers. Just seventeen states license gun dealers. Twenty-three states permit routine inspections of dealers but only two mandate that those inspections occur on a regular basis. Twenty-six states impose record-keeping requirements for gun sales. Only thirteen states require some form of store security measures to minimize firearm theft. We conclude with recommendations for a comprehensive system of state licensing and oversight of gun dealers. Our findings can be useful for the coalition of more than fifty U.S. mayors that recently announced it would work together to combat illegal gun trafficking.