Street youth and labor market strain

This article applies strain theory to a high-risk sample of homeless street youth, with a particular focus upon labor market strain to predict violent and property crime and substance use. Data were collected through interviews with 200 street youth in a western Canadian city. Labor market strain was found to be related to the frequency of the youth's property, violent, and total crimes. Criminal peers and norms were also related to these crimes, as well as to drug use. Results also revealed a significant interaction effect between labor market strain and criminal norms predicting property, violent, and total crime. Interactions between strain and criminal peers, and external attributions also predicted property crime. Contrary to predictions, emotions were unrelated to crime and drug use. The results are discussed in light of Agnew's revised strain theory and suggestions are offered for future research on this topic.     

Cultural Authenticity and Liberal Democracy: A Reply to Colin Tyler

This paper takes issue with Colin Tyler's critique of Bhikhu Parekh's work on liberalism and cultural pluralism in his 'The Implications of Parekh's Cultural Pluralism', Politics 16(3). I argue that Tyler subscribes to an overly monolithic view of cultural identity, that democracy can be a procedural or practical ideal not a cultural understanding, and that in any case the existence of deep-seated cultural pluralism is a good reason for rethinking democratic values and endorsing a republican, rather than liberal, conception of democracy.     

The Impact of Electoral Reform on the Public Service: The New Zealand Case

October 1996 marked the beginning of a new era in New Zealand politics, with the advent of a system of proportional representation based on the German model. This article explores the impact of electoral reform on the public service. First, it summarises the extensive public sector reforms during the mid-to-late 1980s and considers the preparations undertaken by the public service for proportional representation. Second, it outlines the concerns and expectations about the likely consequences of the new electoral system on the bureaucracy. Third, against this background, the article examines the extent to which the public service has been affected by electoral reform. It is argued that despite some notable changes to the political environment within which officials operate, the overall impact of proportional representation on the public service to date has been modest. The analysis presented here is based on a series of interviews conducted during 1997 with ministers, senior public servants, ministerial advisers and parliamentary officials, along with a range of secondary sources.     

The Role of "Enemy Images" and Ideology of Elite Belief Systems

We use data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of American opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investigate two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy beliefs. We assess, first, whether the militant internationalism/cooperative internationalism scheme, developed primarily by Wittkopf (1981, 1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990), has continued relevance now that the USSR has collapsed; and second, whether Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987, 1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993) domain-specific, hierarchical model of mass belief structure can be applied to elite belief systems. The evidence indicates that respondents' past stances toward military and cooperative ventures are highly predictive of their views once the Cold War ends. This continuity in leaders' postures toward international affairs, in itself, suggests that "enemy images" of the Soviet Union were less important within elite belief systems than Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) posited for the mass public. The starkest difference, however, between their findings for mass samples and our findings for a leadership sample centers on the importance of ideology in constraining foreign policy beliefs, and the close interconnection with domestic beliefs. Consequently, as we illustrate, predictable ideological divisions among opinion leaders persist in the post–Cold War era. In sum, our evidence demonstrates considerable continuity in elites' beliefs despite profound changes in the global system, and reaffirms the importance that ideology plays in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems.