Reframing privatisation: Deconstructing the myth of efficiency

In the context of ongoing scandals about public versus private ownership, we review the rise and fall of British nationalised industries, and the subsequent rise of privatisation based on perception of market-based efficiency as a means of improving public service. We evaluate the theoretical and empirical arguments around privatisation and find that the argument of privatisation as a vehicle for efficiency gains is a myth. Instead, we suggest that efficiency is not solely a matter of ownership, but requires a complex interplay of social and commercial variables to make it possible. We call for a more inventive and flexible approach in the search for efficiency in the public sector.     

Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators

Why are people more willing to accept some governmental decisions than others? In this article, we present results from a series of original experiments showing that people's reactions to a given outcome are heavily influenced by the procedure employed to produce the outcome. We find that subjects react much less favorably when a decision maker intentionally keeps a large payoff, thereby leaving the subject with a small payoff, than when that same payoff results from a procedure based on chance or on desert. Moreover, subjects react less favorably to outcomes rendered by decision makers who want to be decision makers than they do to identical outcomes selected by reluctant decision makers. Our results are consistent with increasingly prominent theories of behavior emphasizing people's aversion to being played for a “sucker,” an attitude that makes perfect sense if people's main goal is not to acquire as many tangible goods as possible but to make sure they are a valued part of a viable group composed of cooperative individuals.     

Social networks and non‐market strategy

To date, the field of non‐market strategy has little to offer in the way of an integrated perspective on the simultaneous management of strategic issues and corporate stakeholders. This paper employs social network analysis to make a number of theoretically grounded conjectures about the delicate relationships between stakeholder behaviour and issue evolution. It is found that social network analysis has the potential to enrich and integrate theoretical perspectives in the field of non‐market strategy, offering solutions to a set of previously unresolved puzzles. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Bonding in a High-Risk and a General Sample of Children:Comparison of Measures of Attachment and Their Relationship to Smoking and Drinking

Bonding in parent, peer, and school domains were compared in a general sample of children and a sample of children of methadone-treated parents. Bivariate comparisons revealed that children of methadone-treated parents had lower SES, and were significantly more likely to smoke cigarettes but not more likely to drink alcohol. Several measures of attachment were significantly different between the two samples across parent, peer, and school domains. Multivariate analyses indicated that the children of methadone-treated parents were more likely to smoke, even after accounting for the effects of demographic and attachment variables. For drinking, sample membership was not found to be significant. Attachment to school decreased the odds of both smoking and drinking in both samples. Peer attachment had no effect on the odds of smoking initiation; however,loyalty to best friend did predict increased odds of drinking initiation.     

Regulatory budgeting: A bad idea whose time has come?

Advocates of regulatory relief propose a budget that would annually cap regulatory costs. But emulating fiscal budgeting would be much more difficult than they envision. An arbitrary macrobudgetary constraint would have to be selected, and the potential scope of the regulatory budget would be vast. The process of regulatory budgeting would be very-time consuming, and could increase micromanagement by the Congress. Estimating regulatory costs would be challenging, and ignoring regulatory benefits would be unfair and inefficient. A preferable alternative to regulatory budgeting would be to expand the Government Performance and Results Act to include cost-effectiveness reviews for regulations.     

Rent-seeking in natural resource quota allocations

This paper examines the incentives for rent-seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas to competing user groups by political bodies. The political body has discretion in making the allocation, and competing user groups rent-seek to influence the allocation. We investigate ways in which the governmental body can affect the behavior of the players by setting the ground rules for the competition. A political body can affect an allocatively (Pareto) efficient outcome by choosing an appropriate default (pre rent-seeking) policy. Surprisingly, an allocatively efficient default policy is unlikely to minimize social costs. However, winner-take-all default policies are likely to maximize, not minimize, rent-seeking. A competitive post-allocation market reduces rent-seeking, but is not, either itself or in combination with an efficient default policy, capable of minimizing social costs. However, forcing winners in political redistributions to fully compensate losers both lowers the rent-seeking levels relative to a potential compensation criterion and, when used together with an efficient default policy, is capable of obtaining the first-best solution of an allocatively efficient allocation with zero rent-seeking.     

The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators, party leaders, and groups doing business with congressional committees: The costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements. The problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision-making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible, as in congressional committees. While legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees, once an issue leaves a committee, the costs of monitoring decline, and leadership influence increases. The absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators — those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain. Thus, party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior; however, obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains.     

Distributional coalitions,state strength,and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development

High-performing economies in the Asia-Pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in Latin America prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries. Combining a statist perspective with Olson's theory of interest group formation, this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective. Using a longitudinal research design, this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight Asian-Pacific and twelve Latin American countries. By considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society, the results indicate that approximately two-thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained.     

Local Context and Democratization in Mexico

While democratization is often seen as a national-level process, we argue that there is important scope for local effects. Through analysis of Mexican public opinion data collected on the eve of that country's historic 2000 elections, we demonstrate that local context greatly affects evaluations of the legitimacy of the system, and these evaluations, in turn, help to shape the willingness of citizens to engage with the system. Citizens are more willing to participate in politics if they think the process is fair, and direct evidence of the fairness of the system is provided by the local political context. This local connection, then, becomes critical in the process of individuals becoming, in Almond and Verba's classic term, "participatory" citizens (1963).     

Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures

This paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the House of Representatives. I create a measure of reputational trustworthiness, based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the National Election Studies surveys. I then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame-duck foreign travel by exiting House incumbents within the context of a quasi-experimental research design. The analysis suggests that legislators may be ‘self-policed’ by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity. urveys. I then examine the extent to which such s derived from the National Election Studies