Book reviews

Books for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor, D.V.E. Royall, at Lanchester College of Technology, Coventry.

SALE OF GOODS by G.H.L. Fridman, published by Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., at 50s.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE by Rowland G. Witchell, (1966) published by Oyez Publications at 37s. 6d.

COMPANY LAW by Kenneth Smith and Denis J. Keenan. (1966) published by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd. at 30s.

BUILDING LAW by J.R. Lewis published by Allman & Son, Ltd., at 18s 6d.

BUSINESS LAW by Neil Merritt and E.G. Howard Clayton (1966) published by Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. at 35s (hardback) and 18s: 6d. (paperback).

HILL AND REDMAN'S LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (14th Edn) by W. J. Williams, published by Butterworths & Co. Ltd. at £9. 17. 6 (main work with supplement); supplement alone £1. 7. 6d.     

Psychological Assessment of Chief of Police Candidates: Scientific and Practice Issues

This report examines issues associated with the selection of a Chief of Police. A review of the literature indicates minimal progress in specifying appropriate objective selection procedures for the Police Chief. This is attributable to a research focus on broad leadership styles, rather than specific competencies, and an inattention to the unique needs of individual jurisdictions. As a potential alternative, a hiring process model is offered that includes a systematic job analysis within the given jurisdiction, and the use of a reliable and well-validated instrument to assess job candidates’ leadership potential and skills. This approach is illustrated by a case study of a medium-size city that followed the recommended procedures to make a hiring decision that has been sustained across more than a year’s time, and which appears to be working out. The uses of testing results to help the Chief of Police to enhance personal capabilities within the new position also are discussed.     

The perils of hyper-vigilance: the war on terrorism and the surveillance state in South-East Asia

The analysis examines the puzzle as to why the intelligence structures of South-East Asia largely failed to detect the evolving threat of violently inclined radical Islamic groups, despite the existence of elaborate and pervasive internal security arrangements within the states of the region. The article explores this issue by positing contending viewpoints about how authoritarianism in South-East Asia might have affected the awareness of such threats. Answers to these questions enable an assessment of the current ASEAN response to the ‘war on terrorism’ and to discern whether South-East Asia's elites will move either to improve the quality of their intelligence and threat analysis in the future, or whether they will, instead, extend the instruments of authoritarian rule, further curtailing civil and political space under the rubric of combating terrorism. The evidence so far suggests that the latter outcome is the more likely.     

State Performance‐Based Budgeting in Boom and Bust Years: An Analytical Framework and Survey of the States

The authors examine the track record of applying performance‐based budgeting (PBB) across three time periods within a sample of U.S. state governments: (1) throughout the 1990s, (2) in the early 2000s, and (3) during the Great Recession. State‐level PBB is analyzed according to four elements: (1) the development of performance measures, (2) its applicability to budgeting and management processes, (3) its utility across the business cycle, and (4) its usefulness for budget players. An analytical framework is devised that highlights the “publicness” of American government, draws on the principal–agent model, and considers incentive mechanisms theory. Findings confirm that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and operate well and that PBB functions more effectively for executive management than legislative purposes. PBB is used more by the states during strong economic times as opposed to during economic downturns. More importantly, PBB is only selectively applied by legislators in most states, whereas top executive policy makers, middle managers, and staff embrace and utilize PBB systems more extensively.     

Veto Players Revisited: Internal and External Factors Influencing Policy Production

Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations.