New Thinking in Financial Market Regulation: Dismantling the “Split Share Structure” of Chinese Listed Companies

China’s distinctive set of stock market institutions was introduced in 1990. Among the characteristics of China’s stock markets was a strict separation between different categories of investors. Listed companies issued different categories of shares to state shareholders, domestic corporate investors, domestic individual investors, and foreign investors. By 2005, the barriers segmenting China’s stock market had been significantly relaxed. Domestic investors were allowed to purchase shares previously reserved for foreign investors, and approved foreign investors were allowed to purchase shares previously earmarked for domestic individuals. Nevertheless, a crucial barrier remained. An ongoing debate among Chinese academics, investors, and policy makers focused on how to resolve the “split share structure” (guquan fen zhi) in which a minority of shares were tradable while the majority of shares (namely those reserved for domestic corporate and state shareholders) were excluded from the market. The split share structure was blamed for distorting prices and inhibiting development of the stock market. This paper analyzes the policy adopted to address the split share structure. To what extent does this policy change reflect new thinking on the part of China’s market regulators? This paper argues that analysis of policy making in China’s capital markets can help to distinguish between two competing assessments of China’s political economy. One account sees China pursuing a gradualist strategy, slowly but steadily expanding the role of markets. Another account sees China trapped in a semi-marketized and increasingly corrupt development pattern. The implementation of the split share structure reform program provides evidence to support the gradualist account of incremental, but persistent, reform. Mary Comerford Cooper is an assistant professor in political science at the Ohio State University. Her recent research focuses on the politics of financial markets in China and Taiwan. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics Research Workshop/ Globalization, Institutions and Economic Security Workshop at Ohio State University in May 2007, and at the annual meeting of the Association for Chinese Political Studies in July 2007. I benefited greatly from the constructive and insightful comments of Bj?rn Alpermann, Melanie Barr, Jean-Marc Blanchard, Sarah Brooks, Joseph Fewsmith, Sujian Guo, Dane Imerman, Ryan Kennedy, Marcus Kurtz, Xiaoyu Pu, James Reilly, Alex Thompson, Daniel Verdier, Jianwei Wang, Alan Wiseman, Bin Yu, and an anonymous reviewer. I am also grateful for Lan Hu’s exceptional research assistance. All remaining flaws are purely my own.     

侵权冲突法一般规则之确立——基于罗马Ⅱ与中国侵权冲突法的对比分析

2007年欧盟《非合同之债法律适用条例》(罗马Ⅱ)是侵权冲突法立法的典范。罗马Ⅱ洋溢着平衡与理性的精神,但关键处亦偏袒欧盟国家的利益需要。中国侵权冲突法已经严重滞后于时代。对比罗马Ⅱ与中国侵权冲突法的一般规则,指陈各自的利弊得失,揭示各自所需服务的特殊法律政策,探索侵权行为地法、共同住所地法、最密切联系原则和意思自治这四大系属公式在侵权冲突法的一般规则中的最佳结合方式,有助于我国在当下的国际私法立法中构建科学合理的侵权冲突法的一般规则。     

The decline of an export industry,or the growth of Peruvian sugar consumption in the long run

Growth of domestic consumption of agricultural exportables is a neglected aspect of LDCs’ long‐run primary export performance. Price and income elasticities of local demand for specific exportables vary with economic development, so the Peruvian sugar industry was chosen to illustrate how and why such changes occur. Elasticity estimates for different types of sugar are presented for several time periods between 1913 and 1978. A comparison of these results with those of other researchers suggests that aggregating raw, refined and plantation white sugar consumption may bias income elasticity estimates for refined sugar upwards, and price elasticity estimates downwards.