Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?

Abstract This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable ‘non‐competitive equilibrium’. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware effect’. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda‐setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.     

Philosophies of Polar Law,Edited by Dawid Bunikowski and Alan D. Hemmings (Routledge Research in Polar Law) 2021 – Book Review by Joseph DiMento

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics -     

Evaluating EU responsiveness to the evolution of the international regime complex on climate change

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