Gubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions

Few political institutions are as central to theories of lawmaking as the executive veto. Despite its importance, institutional continuity at the national level has precluded identification of empirical effects of the veto on legislative behavior. We address this limitation and present evidence from the states demonstrating how the veto affects the formation of legislative coalitions and, indirectly, executive influence over policymaking. We find consistent evidence that the presence and strength of gubernatorial veto powers affect the lawmaking behavior of state legislatures. Our analysis shows how institutional provisions condition executives' ability to affect policy outcomes in separation‐of‐powers systems.     

Political Neo-Malthusianism and the Progression of India’s Green Revolution

Academic literature on India’s economic history often portrays the nation’s Green Revolution as a single package of technocratic reforms that eventually led to sustained growth in India’s total agricultural production – the quintessential triumph of science over political resistance. This account, though, is a dramatic oversimplification, which has led both social and natural scientists to criticise the Green Revolution’s normative consequences without fully addressing the political and economic forces that led to its varied results. To date, India’s Green Revolution lacks the established historical periodisation necessary to begin putting these accounts in dialogue. To remedy these issues, this article introduces the adapted concept of political neo-Malthusianism, which deconstructs the relationship between agricultural production, dependence on foreign aid, and the period’s political battles. Understanding this nexus allows not only for a deeper understanding of the politics that shaped various Green Revolution policies’ implementation, but also moves towards an understanding of its larger place in Indian economic history.