Institutions and Economic Performance: The Use and Abuse of Culture in New Institutional Economics

Important research programs within New Institutional Economics advance culturalist arguments to explain failures of economic development. Focusing on the work of Douglass C. North and Avner Greif, this article argues that such arguments rely on an essentialist conception of culture that is both historically inaccurate and analytically misleading. Greif’s work in particular rests on a selective use of empirical data that ultimately distorts the deductive models that are at the core of his work. As a result, both scholars use culture to account for outcomes that are more adequately explained as the product of social conflict and political struggles—struggles in which culture plays a far more contingent and destabilizing role than the one they attribute to it. What is needed, I argue, is to link arguments about the persistence of inefficient institutions with a sociologically informed conception of culture as an ensemble of resources that enhance rather than constrain the scope of individual agency. To come to terms with the effects of culture on institutional formation and change it is necessary to replace the essentialism articulated by North and Greif with a strategic-instrumentalist view in which culture is compatible with a wide spectrum of economic behaviors, individual actions, and thus institutional trajectories.

Institutions and Development in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis

We review the theoretical literature on the concept of institutions and its relationship to national development, propose a definition of the concept, and advance six hypotheses about institutional adequacy and contributions to national development. We then present results of a comparative empirical study of existing institutions in three Latin American countries and examine their organizational similarities and differences. Employing the qualitative comparative method (QCA) proposed by Ragin, we then test the six hypotheses. Results converge in showing the importance of meritocracy, immunity to corruption, absence of “islands of power,” and proactivity in producing effective institutions. Findings strongly support Peter Evans’ theory of developmental apparatuses.

Does the amount of participation matter? Public comments,agency responses and the time to finalize a regulation

The notice and comment rulemaking process is a fundamental part of how agencies write regulations. While this process is starting to receive more empirical attention, the question of how the number of comments that an agency receives affects its decision-making process has received little examination. This paper uses Boolean analysis to examine nine rules from two agencies at the Department of Health and Human Services and evaluates the impact of a high volume of comments on agency changes to proposed rules and the time an agency takes to finalize a proposed rule. These nine cases suggest that agencies are most likely to change their proposals when they receive a high volume of comments on highly complex rules that are not very politically salient. Highly complex rules are also likely to take a long time to finalize when there are many public comments however it is often other factors that cause a long delay between proposed and final rules.

„Gibt es so etwas überhaupt noch?“ Forschung zu Protest und sozialen Bewegungen

Research on protest and social movements has undergone a process of consolidation. However, it has lost visibility in Germany where it was in full bloom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A review of recent scholarship shows that the analysis of protest and the concept of “social movement” is vital to understand both politics emerging “from below” and the dynamics of political processes. While the focus on societal antagonisms which was central in the interpretation of new social movements has been abandoned, historical and cultural approaches have more and more received attention.     

The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror

This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.     

The extent of the population paradox in the Hungarian electoral system

The Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, adopted in 1989, is one of the world’s most complicated electoral systems, and, as this paper demonstrates, it suffers from the “population paradox.” In particular, the governing coalition may lose as many as 8 seats either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes on each territorial list.     

When Did Health Care Become a Campaign Issue?

Most people mistakenly assume that health care first became a major political issue in 1945 because President Harry S. Truman’s special address to Congress on Nov. 19 of that year marked the first time a sitting president publicly endorsed a national health-care program. But the question of whether—or to what extent—it is the responsibility of government to subsidize health care for its citizens has been around for a much longer amount of time. Now that health care has become a major focus of domestic political debate, especially in light of the impending presidential election, this article, modified from an entry in the forthcoming Encyclopedia of Campaigns, Elections, & Electoral Behavior (Sage Publications), serves to inform the reader of the origins and history of health care as a campaign issue.

Why Do Experienced Challengers Do Better than Amateurs?

Politically experienced challengers are more successful in seeking political office than amateurs. The relationship is found so regularly that political experience has become the standard ex ante indicator of challenger quality in studies of American elections. Despite this, little work has investigated why experienced challengers are so successful. Many scholars attribute the relationship to inherent differences between experienced challengers and amateurs: experienced challengers have stronger electoral skills and greater access to material resources. I argue that these differences play a role, but an indirect one. Rather, experienced challengers are lead by both their resource advantage and the high amount of risk they are exposed to in seeking office to run in races in which their party has a good chance of winning. Thus, the direct cause of the experienced challengers’ success is self-selection into winnable races. Empirical analysis supports the self-selection model over a model in which resources directly lead to success.

Lessons of Russian in Afghanistan

The experience of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (1979–1989) is considered through the prism of institutional transfers. Afghanistan has a long history of attempts to implement Muslim, Soviet and Anglo-Saxon institutional designs. Most of them have failed. This failure can be attributed to the lack of ‘elective affinity’ between traditional and new institutions imported from more developed countries. It is argued that a careful examination of the degree of elective affinity must precede any attempt of institutional transfers. An analysis of Ph.D. dissertations defended by Afghan students at Soviet and Russian universities complements logical arguments and references to historical facts.