Procedural Justice and Identification with Virtual Teams: The Moderating Role of Face-to-Face Meetings and Geographical Dispersion

We investigated the previously unstudied relationship between procedural justice and identification within virtual teams, with a particular focus on how two features of virtual teams, namely frequency of face-to-face meetings and geographical dispersion, moderate that relationship. We argue that these two variables are sources of uncertainty, which in turn makes virtual team members more sensitive to perceptions of procedural fairness as essential cues in the identification process. In this study, we used cross-sectional survey methodology and data aggregated to the team level (N = 39). As predicted, our results showed that the link between procedural justice and identification was stronger when there were few face-to-face meetings and when teams were highly dispersed.     

Analytical Fingerprint of Wolframite Ore Concentrates

Ongoing violent conflicts in Central Africa are fueled by illegal mining and trading of tantalum, tin, and tungsten ores. The credibility of document‐based traceability systems can be improved by an analytical fingerprint applied as an independent method to confirm or doubt the documented origin of ore minerals. Wolframite (Fe,Mn)WO₄ is the most important ore mineral for tungsten and is subject to artisanal mining in Central Africa. Element concentrations of wolframite grains analyzed by laser ablation‐inductively coupled plasma‐mass spectrometry are used to establish the analytical fingerprint. The data from ore concentrate samples are multivariate, not normal or log‐normal distributed. The samples cannot be regarded as representative aliquots of a population. Based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov distance, a measure of similarity between a sample in question and reference samples from a database is determined. A decision criterion is deduced to recognize samples which do not originate from the declared mine site.     

Artenschutz durch handelbare Zertifikate?

Handelbare Zertifikate gelten seit einiger Zeit als erfolgreiches Instrument, um Umweltschutzziele m?glichst effektiv und kosteneffizient zu erreichen. Der vorliegende Beitrag besch?ftigt sich mit der Frage, ob dieses Instrument auch im Artenschutz angewandt werden k?nnte. Dabei beschr?nken wir uns darauf, den Grundgedanken des Konzepts aus umwelt?konomischer Sicht darzulegen, potentielle Anwendungsfelder eines Zertifikatehandels im deutschen Recht zu identifizieren und zu umrei?en, wo weiterer Forschungsbedarf besteht. Bei der Identifikation potentieller Anwendungsfelder fragen wir, ob und inwieweit unter den geltenden rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen beeintr?chtigte Habitate geschützter Arten durch neu geschaffene Habitate ersetzt werden k?nnen. Der Schwerpunkt der Betrachtungen liegt auf den Kompensationspflichten der Eingriffsregelung, den Zugriffsverboten des Artenschutzrechts und dem Koh?renzausgleich der FFH-Richtlinie.     

Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs

Since the early 1990s, World Bank officials in many countries have pressed their government borrowers to include nongovernmental organizations as development partners. What impact has this new partnership norm had in the bank's borrower countries, and why? This article investigates these questions through longitudinal analysis of three cases: Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Gambia. In their first iteration in the 1990s, these bank-sponsored efforts generally failed to take root; yet by the 2000s, NGOs and state actors were engaged in multiple partnerships. This article suggests that over time, bank officials' repeated efforts to embed these new ideas fostered a social learning process that led NGOs to adopt more strategic partnership practices and government officials to see NGO partners as useful. Several factors may affect this learning process: levels of professionalism and the growth of professional networks, the presence of effective “bridge builders,” and the level of historical conflicts.     

Hostile takeover and costly merger control

According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Merger Guidelines, mergers determined to be anticompetitive are more likely than not to be challenged. Within an adversarial system, the corresponding process of merger control exhibits two kinds of inefficiencies: First, both the antitrust authority and the buyer spend considerable amounts of resources during litigation. Second, the anticompetitive merger is only prevented with a probability less than one. We can show that these inefficiencies may be smaller under a hostile than under a friendly takeover although the top management of the target firm is introduced as third player, spending additional resources during litigation.     

Das Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates und der Mythos einer 80-Prozent-Europäisierung in Deutschland

Governance beyond the nation state is intensively discussed with regard to the degree of Europeanization of the member states. For some scholars, the Europeanization degree of German legislation has already reached a share of 80 percent. This article applies a quantitative perspective and investigates, whether and to what extent German legislation has been stimulated by European impulses over the past 30 years. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis distinguishes between regular and important legislation and examines whether and to what extent European impulses are induced by EU legislation. The results reveal that previous estimates have dramatically overstated the influence of Europeanization on German legislation. According to our findings, a share of 80 percent has only once occurred in a single policy domain. Usually, this share is significantly lower, in particular for important legislation. Moreover, it is only possible to identify the reasons for half of the Europeanization impulses in the respective EU legislative database.     

Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective

This article is, on one hand, a survey of the core theoretical literature on the economics of public regulation; and, on the other hand, a cohesive discussion about how the literature has matured and how recent contributions on political and regulatory institutions—US and European—are related to, and affect the results of, former lines of research. We conclude that the traditional distinction between public interest theories and special interest theories has lost validity due to the entry of game theory and institutional research. The evolving institutional analysis provides a sophisticated interpretation of possible corrective rationales inherent in regulatory restrictions, and is as such an important complement to the still vigorous special interest literature focusing on the redistributive rationales and their effects.